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Architecture and political power have related throughout history in various 
ways.  The most prominent function of architecture, as well as other aesthetics, 
in the political realm has been to raise the national sentiment of a people.  The 
aesthetics of architecture can be used to sell the ideas of a political system to the 
populace both by the creation of new architecture and the destruction of symbols 
contrary to the polity.  The vehicle by which politics and architecture interrelate is 
shown to be the rhetoric surrounding the buildings.  Exemplary of this is the 
nationalist period of Europe, when characters such as Stalin and Hitler 
manipulated aesthetics to develop national sentiment.  Hence, in newly 
democratic Prague and Berlin we see a change in architecture and a rhetorical 
debate on the national value of styles, though the styles used in each case were 
not the same.  Architectural style is therefore shown not to reflect a specific 
political theory, and national sentiment is again the key way in which architecture 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This study opens with the question: why is there a relationship between 
architecture and national identity?  To get to the eventual answer, it has been 
most important to define the question, what is the connection between 
architecture and politics?  In order to narrow the investigation, the issue of 
national sentiment will be examined, as this has seemed to be the primary way in 
which politics and architecture interact.  Politicians try to affect national sentiment 
through architecture, and they, among others, believe that architecture affects 
national sentiment and therefore politics.  Furthermore, it will be shown that a 
specific style of architecture does not represent a specific polity, or put another 
way, the political rhetoric resulting from architecture relies on nurturing the 
rhetoric, not the nature of the style itself. 
In Chapter II, the issue of national sentiment and architecture will be 
discussed broadly, in a wide geographic area, as well as through a broad range 
of time.  Chapter III will further elucidate how aesthetics and architecture have 
been used by power brokers in Europe’s past to create more power.  The final 
chapter will compare and contrast the recent architecture of Prague and Berlin 
due to the recent political turmoil after the fall of communism.     
Architecture relates to politics through national sentiment, and how many 
politicians and theorists have argued this point in the past.  It follows then, that 
one must argue how, in fact, national sentiment relates to architecture and vice 
versa.  Chapter II will show that architectural style has been argued by some as 
indicative of a specific political will, but the theorists differ as to how the 
architectural style should be used and which one is appropriate for democracy.  
Then the argument will be made that rhetoric is the key to this connection as 
opposed to the aesthetic style of the architecture.  
Chapter III will discuss more specifically how the interplay of architecture 
and politics has performed through Europe’s history.  It will be shown that there 
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has been a relationship between aesthetics and politics throughout history, and 
that the rhetorical link has been visible as well.  From the age of religious 
dominance in Europe through the Enlightenment and into the modern age the 
links can be seen.  Politicians have in fact learned from their predecessors about 
how best to utilize the arts all the way to Hitler who had a great understanding of 
the link between aesthetics, national sentiment, and power.1 
The final examination of this thesis is the way in which political rhetoric as 
it relates to architecture has altered since the political change of 1989.  This will 
be examined through observation of Prague and Berlin and the rhetoric 
surrounding their architecture. 
Berlin is an interesting case due to the political culture of Germany.  It is 
an accelerated case of how politics may well end up in much of central and 
eastern Europe.  Additionally, it is an odd case in that it has a poor economy 
surrounding it, but a good economy supporting it.  Finally, Berlin has the 
advantage of the extra real estate left by the fall of the Wall.  These qualities 
make it an interesting contrast to Prague.  The most striking contrast, though, will 
be that in addressing Berlin, it is most apropos to address the public architecture 
there, as that is where a preponderance of the debate has fallen.  This lends 
itself more ably to the political debate, while maintaining a good amount of public 
debate as well. 
Prague has had less change perpetuated by political entities, but the 
change of private architecture has been interesting.  Another interesting contrast 
between the two capitals is that the amount of wartime destruction between the 
two is significantly different.  In fact, through the Cold war in Prague, there were a 
few areas that remained in ruin from the war, while in Berlin major reconstruction 
was necessary.  Hence a taste of the new was already in the mouths of Berliners 
in 1989.  In Prague, on the other hand, the new buildings were primarily in the 
                                            
1 George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass 
Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich, Howard Fertig, Inc. 
pbk.ed. (New York: H. Fertig, 2001). 
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outskirts of the city.  A further difference between the two cases is that Berlin had 
instant political change in 1990 while the Czech Republic has had more of a slow 
process.  Additionally, Berlin has significant financial aid and political and 
architectural input from western Germany, while Czech’s patronage comes from 
the remainder of the EU, along with the remainder of the new members.  Finally, 
the openings that were made available by the wall itself were not made available 
in the majority of Prague, causing more sprawl than reconsolidation. 
The history of the two capitals is also in some ways interrelated.  Germany 
has had a dubious recent history which they would like to put behind them.  They 
don’t want to forget the past, while they don’t want to relive it every day, either.  
Most of all, they do not want to recall the fascism of their recent past.2  The 
Czech Republic is similar in that they want to put their communist past behind 
them, but the embarrassment of the past and fear of return is not so strong. 
                                            
2  Michael Z. Wise, Capital Dilemma : Germany's Search for a New Architecture of 
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICAL 
POWER 
National sentiment is the way in which architecture relates most commonly 
to politics.  People use architecture to try to raise their national emotions and link 
their population together.  Indeed some argue that government should take 
advantage of the relationship to sentiment, taking the most positive control over 
national architecture.  In fact, Neil Leach, an architect and prolific writer on 
architectural theory, argues in the introduction to one of his books, Architecture 
and Revolution, that Berlin is being ruined by uncontrolled entrepreneurs and 
implies that they should be controlled by a central political structure.3  It has also 
been argued that the new style of architecture for the Soviet Union was more 
repugnant than the new politics the style was supposed to embody.4 
Several examples exist in Europe of how this desire to control 
architectural style been felt by various rulers.  In Poznan, Poland, during 
occupation by Prussia, the Prussians “constructed buildings stylistically alien to 
the city’s architecture to emphasize the greatness of Bismarck’s Prussia.”5  
Furthermore Hitler planned massive changes to the architecture of Germany to 
reflect his great Reich and diverted resources from the war to accomplish this.6  
Also, Nicolae Ceausescu intended to “wipe out Romanian national identity,” 
using architecture during the Cold War using a combination of centralized city 
planning and architectural design.7  He intended to create a fresh start for what 
he thought was a stagnant Romania.  Each of these examples demonstrates how 
                                            
3 Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed., Architecture andRrevolution: Contemporary Perspectives on 
Central and Eastern Europe (London ; New York: Routledge, 1999), 4. 
4 Anders Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era : an 
aspect of Cold War history (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 49. 
5 Malgorzata Omilanowska in Nicola Gordon Bowe, Art and the National Dream: The Search 
for Vernacular Expression in Turn-of-the-Century Design (Blackrock, Co. Dublin, Ireland: Irish 
Academic Press, 1993), 100. 
6  Paul B. Jaskot, The Architecture of Oppression: The SS, Forced Labor and the Nazi 
Monumental Building Economy (London ; New York: Routledge, 2000), 207. 
7 Renata Salecl in Neil Leach ed., Architecture and Revolution, 102. 
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under a totalitarian regime, politics can certainly affect architecture.  Further, it 
shows that these rulers strongly believed that architecture could affect politics in 
the form of national sentiment.  They each wanted to improve their national 
cohesion through the creation of a national architecture. 
These extreme examples simply illustrate the historical application of a 
common theory that architecture can affect national sentiment.  The key to this 
relationship seems to be in the area of remembrance.  “. . . Ancient values are 
considered to have a special importance for current civilization, to regain a lost – 
or supposedly lost – Golden Age.”8  John Ruskin, an art historian and theorist, 
noted the connection between architecture and remembrance in 1849 in his 
celebrated treatise on architecture.  He suggested that, “when we build, let us 
think that we build for ever.  Let it not be for present delight, nor for present use 
alone.”9  Further in relation to the longevity of architecture he notes that, 
“Through its longevity, architecture further documents the history of successive 
generations as it witnesses the deeds of men and their suffering, and 
accumulates ‘that golden stain of time’ which gives it the gift ‘of language’.”10  
This longevity is surely a source that politicians want to ride on to increase their 
own longevity. 
And this remembrance associated with architecture has been used by 
politicians to increase national sentiment to political ends.  Indeed, it is the 
remembrance of styles past that seems to be the basis of many past rises in 
nationalism, including that of the Nazis.11  It is important here to segue way into a 
discussion of style, then, as it has been addressed by nations.  It is important 
because national sentiment and historical style are not necessarily linked.  
                                            
8 Janos Gerle in Nicola Gordon Bowe, Art and the National Dream, 144. 
9  John Ruskin, The Seven Lamps of Architecture (New York: Dover Publications, 1989), 
186. 
10 Paul Hatton in Michael Wheeler and Nigel Whiteley, The Lamp of Memory : Ruskin, 
Tradition, and Architecture (Manchester, UK ; New York; New York, NY, USA: Manchester 
University Press; Distributed exclusively in the USA and Canada by St. Martin's Press, 1992), 
134. 
11  George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses,  252. 
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A. A STYLE FOR DEMOCRACY 
In developing a democratic architecture, it seems the case of style is 
important to many.  Some argue that the style of ancient Greece, being the 
cradle of democracy, best represents their polity.12  Others emphasize the 
openness of glass structures represented in the International or Modernist 
styles.13  This study counters that Modernist, Postmodernist, Greek Revival or 
International Style could all be representative of democracy.14  The determining 
factor is the will of the people.  If people in the Czech Republic decide that they 
should display International, Classical, Modern, Cubist or some form of Czech 
national style, the people have then spoken.  In fact, a diversity of architecture is 
more indicative of a diverse people than a monotonous style.  It is the purpose of 
Chapter IV, then, to show how two examples of post-Soviet polities have 
demonstrated their democratic politics in their architecture. 
Alex de Tocqueville was skeptical of democratic style and more 
specifically the fate of the arts in a democracy.  He argued that in the United 
States, democracy has in fact forced the decline of high art.  His argument went 
that a decrease in aristocracy leads to a decline of fine art through a lack of 
patronage.  He further stated that only art and education could provide the 
synthesis needed to evolve a more enlightened and cultivated electorate .15  A 
current example of how this has reared up in today’s politics is in the United 
States National Endowment for the Arts.  As politicians began to take an interest 
in it, the Endowment began to focus more on dissemination of art than 
encouragement of better standards in art.  In fact as funding for the Endowment 
                                            
12  Deyan Sudjic and Helen Jones, Architecture and Democracy (London: Laurence King, 
2001), 20-21. 
13 Michael Wise, Capital Dilemma, 190. 
14 Each of these styles is, in fact exemplified in various parliaments throughout the 
democratic countries of the world.  The German Parliament in Berlin is a modern reconstruction 
of the old Baroque building; London’s Westminster as well as the parliament buildings of 
Cananda and Hungaryare in the Gothic style;  and the Bonn capital was in the International Style, 
according to Deyan Sudjic with Helen Jones, Architecture and Democracy (Glasgow: Laurence 
King Publishing, 1999). 
15 Robert Brustein in Arthur M. Melzer et al., Democracy & the Arts (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 11-12. 
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went up, people took notice of it and argued their aesthetic beliefs to the 
politicians who tamed the endowment, and brought its money to less 
controversial artists.16 
There are many arguments, though, that despite these stylistic limitations 
and concerns a style is essential in democratic architecture.  What is called for by 
most authors is a new architecture for the new times.17  Daniel Libeskind argues 
that architecture should neither erase the past nor revisit the past, but should rest 
at a happy medium.18  In fact, postmodern architecture is a style appropriate to 
this idea, because “from classicism to modernism, the various aesthetic doctrines 
all maintained that art reflects the single, eternal truth about life.  In the 
postmodern age, such confidence is disparaged as naïve, dangerous, or both.”19   
The postmodernists are not the only ones to argue for a style, though.  
Hungary is an example of how people are arguing for a national architecture 
derived from the peasant vernacular.  Of course there is much debate over what 
peasant form is truly national when the peasants borrow from parallel societies – 
Russian architecture in this case.20  In another nod to a national style, writing on 
Turkish national architecture in the 1930s SIbel Bozdogan says that the Turks 
rejected both the Ottoman past and the western ideals in their pursuit of a 
national style.  They arrived at their own form – “a program of ‘nationalizing the 
modern’.”21  This led to a combination of modern and vernacular. 
This variance of styles is the first indicator that a specific architectural style 
and a corresponding political structure are not related.  Many further arguments 
                                            
16 Ibid., 12. 
17 See Bernard Tschumi “Disjunctions,” in Neil Leach, Architecture and Revolution, 146-149, 
and the conclusion to Anders Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the 
Stalin Era. 
18 Daniel Libeskind in Neil Leach ed., Architecture and Revolution, 127-129. 
19 Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, in Melzer et al., Democracy 
& the Arts, 8-9. 
20 Janos Gerle in Nicola Gordon Bowe, Art and the National Dream, 213. 
21  Sibel Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation Building : Turkish Architectural Culture in the 
Early Republic (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), 240-241. 
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have supported this.  The argument is that it is not the aesthetics of architecture 
that is the political part, but the actual use of space.22  “What the new Europe 
needs . . . is a new approach to architectural theory more responsive to the 
fluidity and flux of today’s society, one that is more in tune with the technological 
conditions of our contemporary existence.”23  Inevitably both national vernacular 
and international styles are combined when considering a national style.24  
Examples of this phenomenon of mixing architectural styles are world wide.  In 
Japan, for instance, in the post World War era, architects arrived at a national 
style which joined their traditional style with modern methods, developing a new 
style for themselves.25 
The bottom line reached by most, then, is that style is not indicative of 
polity.  Some authors beg to differ, though.  Indeed, Ruskin argued throughout 
his work that Gothic architecture was the most appropriate for a national style.  
This style played to his theme of architecture of remembrance and furthered it by 
saying that this architecture recalled the good things about the national past of 
Britain.  And the postmodernists, while arguing that a confluence of architectural 
styles is necessary imply that some other styles are inappropriate for democracy. 
This multiplicity of opinions demonstrates in the end that no one style is 
indicative of democracy, and I would further argue that the same can be said of 
any polity.  It must be noted, though, that style still has a political role to play.  For 
example, while the Gothic does not imply democracy by itself, as would be 
argued by the Japanese, perhaps it is appropriate for England, as Ruskin argued 
a century and a half ago.  Nations would do themselves a service by developing 
a national architectural style, and this style is all that remains in question.  Indeed 
the Japanese, British, Romanians, and Hungarians as well as the Germans and 
                                            
22 Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed., 119-120 . 
23 Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed. 
24  Lawrence J. Vale, Architecture, Power, and National Identity (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992), 273.   
25  Cherie Wendelken-Mortensen, Living with the Past: Preservation and Development in 
Japanese Architecture and Town Planning , (PhD Dissertation, MIT, 1994) 
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Czechs have been developing and debating their national style over the past 
decade.  The connection, then, between style and polity is rhetorical.  
B. THE RHETORICAL LINK 
The nurture of a rhetorical link is primary in the connection between 
architecture and politics.  There have been multiple cases of how this link is 
established, maintained and changed, and it is this malleability of the rhetoric that 
this chapter addresses.  The style of architecture can stay the same, and indeed 
the form of political space created by a piece can remain unchanged, but the 
surrounding political rhetoric can change the meaning of a building completely. 
Structures create political rhetoric, but the problem is that the rhetoric 
created is not under the control of the creator.  Parliamentary buildings are the 
obvious example of architecture is intended to create political rhetoric.   
It is argued that parliamentary buildings and spaces (1) preserve 
cultural values of the polity over time; (2) articulate 
contemporaneous political attitudes and values; and (3) contribute 
to the formation of political culture. . . . It is concluded that the 
advent of television broadcasting of parliamentary sessions may 
make these architectural features even more important in 
perpetuating, manifesting and shaping political culture.26 
This statement from the British Journal of Political Science sums up how 
architecture is intended to create political rhetoric.  The structure should make a 
statement which will be indelible upon the society.  However, this interpretation of 
the art is subject to reinterpretation. 
The obvious example of this reinterpretation is that of the “People’s 
Palace” in Bucharest.  Ceausescu demolished a great swath of the old capital 
city to create a monumental piece of architecture.  His intent was to show the 
world the greatness of Romania and the Romanian people through a fantastic 
capitol complex.  A great boulevard was cut, four kilometers long, through the 
city, trees were planted to line the avenue, and at the end the second biggest 
                                            
26  Charles T. Goodsell, "The Architecture of Parliaments: Legislative Houses and Political 
Culture," British Journal of Political Science 18, no. 3 (1988): 287. 
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building (next to the Pentagon) in the world was constructed.27  Ceausescu 
intended to “wipe out Romanian national identity,” and replace it with a 
communist identity.28 
There followed great debate as to the fate of the Palace after the fall of 
communism in 1989.29  The people discussed what must be done with the 
building.  Should it be razed for what it represents?  Of course, the answer 
reached was “no.”  Instead it was merely transformed rhetorically into the 
“People’s House,” demonstrating that whatever political content might seem to be 
invested in architectural form may subsequently be erased or rewritten.” 30 31  
Another example of rhetorical transformation is “Stalin’s Palace” in 
Warsaw.  “Its actual appearance has been less significant than its hybridic ability 
to encode different meanings.” These include Western, Polish, feminine, 
subversive and capitalist, among others. 32   Essentially, the People of Poland 
have done the same rhetorical and physical adaptation as the Romanians did.  
The building has been changed in internal form and used to house a “slick” 
convention center, a casino, the World Business Center, Coca-Cola Poland; 
some very non-communist spaces.  The people argue both that this capitalist use 
of the building is poetic in its response to the Stalinist times, and that it is 
inappropriate for this representation of the communist past.  Using a comparison 
of new democratic architecture and totalitarian architecture created during the 
cold war, this example shows that there is no connection between style and 
ideology, beyond the rhetorical link.33    
                                            
27 Renata Salecl in Neil Leach ed., 92-108. 
28 Ibid., 102 
29 Ibid., 100 
30 Ibid., 104 
31 Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed., 118 
32 Magdalena Zaborowska, “The Height of (Architectural) Seduction: Reading the “Changes” 
through Stalin’s Palace in Warsaw, Poland.” Journal of Architectural Educaiton (2001), 210. 
33 Magdalena Zaborowska, 205-207. 
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So though rhetoric is the key, it is not as powerful of an ally as politicians 
might hope.  Indeed the permanence they sometimes seek through their projects 
is every so often transformed into something they would not agree with, and now 
and then it may backfire to be a symbol of the political poverty of their regime.  
This is due to the changing nature of politics.  In previous times, it was argued 
that architecture should be read like a book, and for the initiated it could.34  This 
is not to say that a person could observe the façade of a church and see “the 
quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog.”  What was intended was that the 
educated person could see what the artist intended with specific details or 
“words”, then put some thought into whether the architect had made a worthwhile 
“statement” with the building. 
In modern times, though, buildings are subject to broader interpretation, in 
that the uninitiated are reading them, and the opinion of the uninitiated matters.  
As de Tocqueville speculated, art and architecture have become subject to mass 
scrutiny and mass appeal, and artists have reacted by creating an architecture 
for the masses.  In many ways it is not feasible to create public architecture that 
does not speak to the masses.  In a democratic society, their opinion counts to 
the politicians.  Private architecture is only withheld by building codes, though in 
many places, these too control aesthetics. 
Most theorists agree that rhetoric is the link between architecture and 
politics.   For instance, Leach, who edited a book about architecture and politics 
in eastern Europe said, “Architecture can only be politicized through association, 
thereby challenging the commonly held belief that architectural form is in and of 
itself political.”35  He adds that “Political content does not reside in architectural 
form; it is merely grafted on to it by a process that is strictly allegorical.”36  His 
final paragraph sums up the connection of politics and architecture quite well. 
                                            
34 Paul Hatton in Wheeler and Whiteley, The Lamp of Memory, 123-124 
35 Neil Leach ed., 6 
36 Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed., 118 
 13 
It is only perhaps if we are to understand architecture, along with 
the other visual arts, as offering a form of backdrop against which 
to forge some new political identity, that we might recognize a 
political role for architecture, albeit indirect.  For this backdrop, 
although neutral in itself, will always have some political ‘content’ 
projected on to it.37 
C. CONCLUSION – ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICAL POWER 
In explaining the link between architecture and politics, the argument is 
twofold.  First, contrary to architectural and political theorists there is no link 
between a specific architectural style and a specific polity.  This theme is 
reiterated again and again throughout the relevant literature.  Second, the link 
that does exist is that of rhetoric, and it is here that politics plays a great role in 
the creation of and design of architecture.  This rhetoric is malleable, though, as I 
have noted earlier.  The question remains then, if the designer of a building is not 
in control of the subsequent reading of the building, then who is?  Perhaps no 
one, but in the remaining investigation, I hope to reveal some alternative 
thoughts on how this question may be answered.  In that pusuit, we now turn to 
the history of architecture and politics in Europe. 
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III. THE ROLE OF AESTHETICS IN POWER BUILDING IN 
EUROPE 
This chapter will show how symbolism was used through art and 
architecture by the powerful in Europe to advance their political agenda.  Though 
there are many other symbolic ways that people tried to advance their politics 
that will not be elucidated here, the purpose of this argument is to narrow the 
study to the fine arts of architecture, art, and sculpture and how these aesthetic 
tools contributed to the advancement of power in Europe.38  This broadening of 
the scope of investigation to include the other fine arts will provide adequate 
background about how Architecture and Politics relate through aesthetics.  This 
history will begin with the power of the church and progress through the 
secularization of the enlightenment and end with the “secular religion” of 
nationalism.39 
The argument of how the powerful used the aesthetics of symbols begins 
with the fact that political theory is based on ideas, which can only be 
conceptualized in the mind.  In order to advance this idea, the power holders 
used concrete objectifications of the idea, in other words symbols.  “Symbols 
were visible, concrete objectifications of the myths in which people could 
participate.”40  Thus, religion used symbols as described through the remainder 
of the chapter, to bring their theology to the people, to give them something 
tangible to witness in their faith.  Furthermore, secularists as well as the 
nationalists used aesthetics in later years to express their ideas in tangible form.  
Thus even in architecture aesthetics were primary, even though function plays a 
                                            
38 George Mosse describes many of the ways that Nazi Germany advanced their power 
using aesthetics and symbolism.  Specifically, see Nationalization of the Masses and George L. 
Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: reshaping the memory of the world wars (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990).  Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 
2003) is another extensive source on the subject. 
39 The reference to “secular religion” is found in many studies of nationalism, including  
Hagen Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism: from the Middle Ages to the Present, (Oxford, 
UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1996), 150, 152, and George Mosse, Nationalization of 
the Masses, 5-6. 
40  George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 7. 
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role there as well.  In other words form did not follow function in political or 
religious architecture. 
There were three religious and political power bases in which aesthetic 
instruments were used to further their purpose that will be covered in this 
chapter, and they will be addressed in chronological order.  First, organized 
religions used aesthetics to promote religion to the masses, or in some cases to 
promote the superiority of one religion over another.  Next, in the revolutionary 
era of Europe, the enlightened used aesthetics to assist in the change from 
Church power to secular power.  Finally, in the 20th century, new political entities 
that were not possible in previous eras promote the new religion of nationalism.41  
The deepest study here will be on that of the nationalists, not because they have 
had a monopoly on the use of aesthetics in the development of power, but 
because the examples there are the most widely available to the author. 
A. CHRISTIANITY USES AESTHETICS TO FURTHER THEIR RELIGION 
1. The Early Church 
The dominance of Christian aesthetic culture began after the fourth 
century, when Roman Architecture, literature and institutions lost their uniting role 
for the citizens of Europe.  The slow but obvious decline of the Roman Empire 
left a political vacuum that needed to be filled, but some of the culture remained 
in Christianity, the Latin language and Roman law as it had been preserved in 
the writings of the church.42  So afterwards, Christianity became the religion of 
the land, and gained great political power. 
Christianity thence created some of the most recognizable art and 
architecture that we know today.  Art and architecture require sponsorship or 
money, and during these times the Church held vast amounts of property and 
                                            
41 An overview of how these religious eras played a part in Europe is seen in René Rémond, 
Religion and Society in Modern Europe (Oxford ; Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).  
The era of church power can bee seen alternately in Euan Cameron, Early Modern Europe: an 
Oxford History (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Owen Chadwick, The 
Reformation, [1st ed.], reprinted with revisions (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England ; New York: 
Penguin Books, 1990).  Nationalism is covered in two books by George Mosse, The 
Nationalization of the Masses and George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers.   
42  Euan Cameron, Early Modern Europe, 10. 
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wealth, and therefore sponsored a large amount of art.  St. Peter’s basilica is 
exemplary of this.  The basilica itself is recognizable to most, in name if not in 
form, and the nearby paintings of Michelangelo in the Sistine Chapel are some of 
the best known art works in the world.  The art had many symbolic 
interpretations, among them that the church had demonstrated authority through 
the creation of artworks.  “Mythical symbolism leads to an objectification of 
feelings; myth objectifies and organizes human hopes and fears and 
metamorphosizes them into persistent and durable works.”43   
To create the artistic symbols needed by the Church, then, it encouraged 
the creation of art and declared how inspiration came from divine roots.  The 
church defined the ability to artistically express as a gift from God in the following 
manner.  Art in these early times was seen as one of the divine gifts to man, 
because only man was given the power to transform his environment using 
techne.  Like man could release the chair from the wood of a tree, he could 
release art from paint and canvas or a colonnade from blocks of stone.  Since 
many of these arts had not penetrated outside of Europe, this was a way that 
Europeans felt they had been chosen by God in their early history.44 
One early example of the interplay of ecclesiastic politics and aesthetic 
expression is in the maps of the early middle ages.  Some of the first surviving 
maps were designed to illustrate the conceptual divisions between the 
continents.  Life began in Asia which was drawn on the top of the map, and then 
Europe and Africa were beneath, with Jerusalem in the center. (See Figure 1.  )  
“They showed not so much our place upon the surface of the planet, as our 
relationship as races to one another.”45  Function was subordinate to form, as we 
shall see throughout this chapter.  Art thus followed religious beliefs and religion 
furthered their teachings through art. 
                                            
43 David Bidney, “Myth, Symbolism and Truth,” Myth, A Symposium, ed. Thomas A Sebeok 
(Bloomington, Ind., and London, 1958), 14, quoted in George Mosse, The Nationalization of the 
Masses, 210. 
44  Euan Cameron, Early Modern Europe, 15. 
45  Ibid., 4. 
 18 
Figure 1.   The ‘Mappa Munidi’ T-map drawn in the early thirteenth century.  
Jerusalem may be seen at the center of the map with Asia at the top and the 
other known continents below.  From Euan Cameron, Early Modern Europe, 3. 
 
 
The importance of architecture for Christianity was not new.  “The idea of 
the ‘sacred space,’ a place which could be filled only with symbolic activity, dates 
back to primitive time and pagan worship, later taken over by Christians.  Such 
space was considered, throughout history, as a necessary prerequisite to 
liturgical action.”46  An example of how seriously the Christians took the 
development of architecture is the construction of St. Peter’s basilica in Rome.  
                                            
46  George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 208. 
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The Pope spent more money than he had on hand to construct the new basilica, 
and used ‘indulgences’ to finance what he needed.  The indulgences involved 
trading absolution for money and wound up being one of the problems that 
stirred the Reformation.47  Thus a noteworthy risk was taken, merely to build an 
aesthetic symbol for Christianity.  Aesthetics were again superior to rationality. 
2. The Reformation 
The Reformation was a kind of ideological civil war within Christianity; 
hence some of the weapons used were aesthetic.  Different sects, such as the 
Calvinists and Humanists, had different ideologies sprouting from new 
philosophical interpretations of the Bible.  These different viewpoints were 
expressed aesthetically as well as philosophically, of course and hence affected 
aesthetics, in some cases quite seriously.  Ideology again used aesthetic tools. 
The Reformed church changed church architecture along with doctrine to 
indicate different beliefs.  For instance, the belief that prayer was as important as 
preaching led to a reading platform at the same level as the pulpit as opposed to 
the previous norm of a pulpit higher than the reader.  This is an example of an 
aesthetic change as an expression of the differing theologies, and served as an 
outward demonstration of how different they were.48  In other words, if the 
tradition was to be changed in the liturgy, it would be made plain by expressing it 
in the aesthetics of the church as well. 
Hence, in the late 17th century Protestant churches no longer looked like 
Catholic churches.  In fact a Protestant, upon entering a catholic church would 
find a “strange or repellant or unintelligible atmosphere.”49  This was due to the 
Protestant disconnection with Christianity of the earlier times.  This type of 
differentiation was intended and was likely welcomed by the Protestants as well 
as the Catholics.  They would want their people to see the differentiation that 
they were expressing theologically. 
                                            
47  Owen Chadwick, The Reformation, 41-42. 
48  Ibid., 422. 
49  Ibid., 369. 
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Another symbolic difference that came with the Reformation was in the 
use of the church building.  In the earlier days under Catholicism, the church was 
not only the place for religious gathering, but the main secular structure in many 
communities through the middle ages.  It was sometimes used for “business, for 
a law court, a market, a school, a promenade, a feast.”  This was somewhat 
understandable, as the church was in many cases the sole public building in the 
town.  However, there was a change of attitude during the Reformation that 
solemnified the space and it became less acceptable to conduct secular 
business in the church.50 
One further expression of religious difference within Christianity was 
expressed less productively.  This aesthetic expression of faith was the 
destruction of the monuments of the old religion.  Calvinists destroyed many 
church symbols because in their strict interpretation of the scriptures, these 
symbols were idol worship.51  Due to their severe understanding of texts, zealous 
reaction to the interpretation, and just as importantly, the need to show an 
aesthetic difference from their predecessor, many artifacts were destroyed.   
Later, in the era of the Counter-reformation, the Laudians (or English 
Puritans) replaced many of these artifacts, and reintroduced art to the churches.  
Many hidden artifacts were brought out of the cupboards and some of the 
destroyed symbols were recreated.52  Again, in the counterreformation, the 
theological change was noted in a change of the aesthetics of the church.   
This theological and aesthetic turn of events is a demonstration of how the 
difference in view on art was not limited to the Protestants versus the Catholics.  
The different Protestant sects also differed on how they viewed the consumption 
of art both in the church and among the congregation.  Obviously, the 
aforementioned divine gift of art was disputed between these sects of the 
Protestants.  Another example of this conflict was within the Humanist sect of 
                                            
50  Ibid., 425-428. 
51  Ibid., 362-363. 
52  Ibid., 225-227. 
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Protestantism.  Though they had a common title, within the sect the southern and 
northern Humanists differed, and art was a part of it.  “Italian humanism was 
literary, artistic, philosophical, whereas northern humanism was religious, even 
theological,” meaning that the northerners of England France and Germany 
shunned the use of art more than the Italians.  This was due in part to the Italian 
humanists’ romantic attachment to their past and the artistic trappings thereof.53 
Of course, there were also aesthetic differences expressed from the 
religions outside of Christianity, and especially where these lands geographically 
met the Christian lands.  The most glaring example is that of the Muslim Ottoman 
Empire.  Despite the fact that the Ottomans showed a good amount of religious 
tolerance at the time, allowing Christians to continue their religious practices after 
conquest of their lands, they made aesthetic changes to Christian symbols.54  
Some churches were destroyed by them upon takeover of Christian lands, 
though others were converted into mosques and some were left to the 
Christians.55  This alteration of symbolic power demonstrated the supremacy of 
their society over the conquered one, and perhaps the superiority of their religion.   
This take over of the symbols by a new faith was not always complete.  
The church of St. Sophia is an example as noted by Owen Chadwick, a historian 
and prolific author of Christian history:   
Though the noblest of Byzantine churches, St Sophia, had been 
given minarets and converted into a mosque, Christians continued 
to visit the holy places there, and Turks joined with them in their 
reverence for the doors made from the wood of the ark or for the 
holy well covered with a stone from the well of Bethlehem.56 
The fact that the symbols maintained their value to each faith no matter 
what the building surrounded them represented demonstrates how religious 
                                            
53  Ibid., 30. 
54  Ibid., 349-55.  Though Christians did not have all of the same rights as Muslims, they 
were treated better than they had treated the Jews, Amos Elon, The Pity of It All: a History of the 
Jews in Germany, 1743-1933 1sted. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002). 
55  Owen Chadwick, The Reformation, 354-55. 
56  Ibid., 354. 
 22 
symbolism was not subject to the geography or buildings that surrounded it, it 
was durable.  In other words, the Ottoman takeover of Constantinople was not a 
complete takeover of the Christian symbols there; in the destruction of symbols, 
each one must be addressed individually. 
In the era of religious dominance of politics, theology supported the 
creation of art, in order to advance their views.  Art was used as a physical 
expression of a cognitive idea and hence made the idea more available to the 
masses.  In the churches, these symbols were perceived as important affecters 
on the congregation.  Sects, as well as separate religions, used the tool of 
aesthetics in this manner, by both symbolic and actual destruction of rival 
aesthetics and creation of their own.  Later, the secular movement that went 
along with political revolution used the same methods. 
B. THE ENLIGHTENMENT USES AESTHETICS 
During the age of the enlightenment, industrialization and political 
revolution, there was a drive to rid politics of religious influence.  This period of 
secularization used some of the aesthetic methods of religion to move the 
populace to their point of view. 
As in the earlier times, the destruction of symbols was not always literal.57  
Some ecclesiastic buildings were demolished, but some were merely taken over 
during the era of secularization in Europe.  For example, some Churches were 
turned over to the prison authority or to the Military, saved by a fortunate side 
effect of the secularization of Church property.  In other cases they were in fact 
razed in the name of progress and city planning, intentionally saying that the use 
of the space for a new industrial society was more important than the religious 
symbolism of the building itself.58  This negated their previous religious 
significance, whether by redesignation or by destruction. 
                                            
57 See the aforementioned examples of the shared symbols in the Hagia Sophia, the 
dedicated use of churches in the Reformation, the removal and replacement of religious symbols 
in the Reformation and Counter-reformation, and the change of the interior design of churches by 
the Protestants. 
58  René Rémond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe, 145. 
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Another way the secular invaded the churches was political.  As they had 
done before the Reformation, the churches would be used for the political 
furtherance of the regime.  In eastern Europe, for example, Churches spread 
farther than bureaucrats could effectively control or extract from the populace.  
Therefore, the politicians used the churches as adjuncts to state authority, to 
distribute state information.  For example, Hapsburg churches were required to 
announce official edicts at the Sunday sermons.59 
Of course, secular forces used aesthetics to promote their power as well, 
even in the era of Christian primacy.  For example, in 1530 the Medici family 
were restored to power in Florence and “proceeded to secure their power by 
many means: . . . the construction of a bastioned fortress to cow the city and an 
imposing block of government offices from which to administer the state . . . and 
lavish patronage of the arts.” 60  The fortress is a good example of the use of 
architecture by the Medici: “The Fortezza da Basso at Florence was built by the 
Medici from 1534 to overawe the citizens of the once fiercely republican city over 
which they ruled as princes from 1530.”61 (Figure 2.  )  This demonstrates how 
the function of a building can lead to impressive aesthetics that will achieve the 
symbolic goals of the architect.  It was difficult to tell how effective these attempts 
were, though here it is only important to note that the powerful, secular as well as 
ecclesiastical, attempted to affect political change through aesthetics.  They 
attempted various methods to do this, which were built on through the centuries 
as we shall see through the development from church art to nationalist art. 
Paris has two important examples of how during the time of secularization 
and industrialization people attempted to overshadow the Christian symbols of 
the city.  The first is the present day symbol of Paris, the Eiffel Tower.  It was 
“intended to be the monumental reply on the Paris skyline to the Sacré Coeur on 
                                            
59  Euan Cameron, Early Modern Europe, 330. 
60  Ibid., 117. 
61  Ibid., 111. 
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Figure 2.   Fortezza de Basso, Florence.  From Euan Cameron, Early Modern 
Europe, 111. 
 
the summit of Montmartre.”62  It was modern steel construction in the burgeoning 
age of industrialism versus the classic stone masonry of the past.  Then, in a 
statuary example of art representing secularization in Paris, the municipal council 
erected a statue of Chevalier de la Barre, a victim of religious intolerance, near 
the Sacré Coeur basilica and named the street leading to the basilica after him.63  
This was an even more direct symbolic assault on the dominance of the Catholic 
Church during the time of secularization in France. 
C. NATIONALISM USES AESTHETICS 
The remainder of the chapter will be dedicated to how the new religion of 
nationalization followed in the aesthetic footsteps of the Church and the 
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secularization movement in Europe, using aesthetics to develop political power.64  
Some people in the new societies wanted to nationalize the people into a 
homogenous whole.  They used common national history to do this, and hence 
they used many of the aesthetic tools already utilized by the church in earlier 
centuries.  In other words, they destroyed the symbols of their rivals and created 
symbols of their own. 
In the view of the nationalists history played a vital role, and so the church 
was not only used for a model of how to gain power through aesthetics, but was 
itself used as a symbol.  The Church was a symbol of the heritage of the people, 
and could hence be used by the nationalists to unite the masses.  As noted 
before “Mythical symbolism leads to an objectification of feelings.”65  Therefore 
the existing symbol of the church itself was a logical place to begin the 
representation of history. 
The nationalists used symbolism like the church had in order to unite the 
people into a common history despite reservations they may have had about 
allowing this parallel power to perpetuate.66  The nationalists even imitated the 
Christian liturgy in songs, speeches, and celebrations.  In fact they learned from 
the past use of aesthetics and symbolism through all sources and tried to 
amalgamate the best of all worlds.  They imitated the Protestant focus on song, 
sermon, and common prayer while using the Catholic tendency to symbolism, 
aesthetics and architecture.67  This imitation was presented to the people in the 
form of national festivals where they marched in national formations, sang 
national songs and heard national speeches while surrounded by the nature of 
the nation and/or the national architecture.    In the case of the Soviet Union in 
the inter-war years, the “national” festivals of May Day and the October 
                                            
64  George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 252.  See especially pp. 5-7 for 
discussion of nationalism as religion. 
65  David Bidney, “Myth, Symbolism and Truth”. 
66  The German nationalists’ desire to decrease the power of the church is noted throughout 
George Mosse’s chapter on public festivals in George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 
73-99. 
67  Ibid., 77-81. 
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Revolution were used to replace the religious festivals.  They basically invented 
traditions.68  Though these parallels were obvious to the people who witnessed 
the festivals, the people were not put off by it and enjoyed the new national 
liturgy. 
Architecture was a complimentary aesthetic to the festivals.  As the 
Catholics needed a place for the mass, festivals needed a place to be staged, 
and the nationalists intended for national architecture to take the place of 
churches.  The architect Theodor Fischer wrote that “we must create buildings 
through which men can once more be formed into a higher cosmic community.”69  
George Mosse, a historian and prolific writer on the subject of nationalism 
continues that, “National consciousness is best expressed through liturgy and 
symbols.”70  In the case of the Soviet Union, the message conveyed was that the 
Union would endure.71  Hence, architectural symbolism has great importance for 
nationalism as it had for the Church, the reformation and secularization 
beforehand. 
Symbolism was key, as we have seen, to making ideas into tangible 
things the people could witness.  Indeed the new religion of nationalization “relied 
upon a variety of myths and symbols which were based on the longing to escape 
from the consequences of industrialization.”72  They wanted to use the old 
methods to proceed into the future and to create for themselves a new religion in 
the eyes of the people, that of nationalism.  To examine how this relationship 
between aesthetics and nationalism developed, we must first define nationalism, 
then describe the history.  Finally, we will extensively examine the way that 
                                            
68 Anders Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era, 34.  The 
use of “national” to refer to the Soviet Union is a loose interpretation of the word.  The term is 
used in this text, though, as the Soviet Union was trying to develop a nation and Soviet 
nationalism in the same way that the French and British brought together previously disparate 
nationalities in their states. 
69 Theodor Fischer paraphrased in George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 67. 
70  Ibid., 136. 
71 Anders Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era, 39 
72  George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses., 6. 
 27 
national sentiment, as described in Chapter II, was used by nationalism and how 
aesthetic tools played a part. 
1. Nationalism Defined 
Nationalism, national sentiment, and patriotism are sometimes used 
interchangeably in everyday speech, so it is important to make sure that a 
definition is pinned down.  National sentiment is actually one of the sources of 
nationalism, and will hence be contrasted and discussed in greater detail in the 
later section on national development processes.  Webster defines patriotism as 
“love and loyal or zealous support of one’s own country.”  The first definition of 
nationalism, oddly enough for this study, is patriotism, but the remaining two are 
more revealing: “1.b) excessive, narrow, or jingoist patriotism; chauvinism.  2. 
The doctrine that national interest, security, etc. are more important than 
international considerations.”73  These last two identify the type of nationalism 
discussed in this chapter. 
A more comprehensive definition as it applies to this study is from Ernest 
Renan, a 19th century religious and cultural scholar: 
A nation is a soul, a mental principle.  Two things that are in fact 
one and the same constitute this principle.  One of them is a store 
of memories, the other is a currently valid agreement, the wish to 
live together . . . A nation, then, is an extended community with a 
peculiar sense of kinship sustained by an awareness of the 
sacrifices that have been made in the past, and in the sacrifices the  
nation is prepared to make in the future.  A nation presumes a past, 
but the past is summed up in one tangible fact: the agreement, the 
desire to live life in common.74 
Renan’s themes of memory and awareness of sacrifices and how these 
lead to kinship or the desire to live life in common seem to be the most revealing 
observations about nationalism taken from this study.  They contrast with the less 
convincing earlier theory of Weimar Consistorial Counselor, Johann Gottfried 
                                            
73  David Bernard Guralnik, Webster's New World dictionary of the American Language, , 
2nd college ed. (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1986), 1692. 
74  Ernest Renan, quoted in Hagen Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism, 97. 
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Herder who thought that language and culture were primary for national 
identity.75 
Another interesting parallel definition of nationalism is actually more of an 
observation: that nationalism was the new secular religion.  This is an important 
change in the definition of one’s cultural role due to the decline of the church as a 
moral authority and the rise of the state in this capacity.76  In other words, the 
estates of nobility, church, and citizens were giving way to democracy and losing 
their power to the social legitimization of the nation.  This metamorphosis of 
culture brought problems to people as they tried to define their role in life 
because the estates as the basis for social legitimacy were disappearing as the 
princes were no longer ruling by divine right, but by the will of the people.77  One 
example of how this played out was the French Peasants, who were slow to 
move in to the new political system due to their comfort with their identity within 
the estates.  They were not ready to deal with an abstract government, because 
they had always had a king.  They thought that “If there’s no king, there’s no 
government.”78 
Nationalism developed as a concept and as a source of social 
legitimization from other social theories of the time the “isms”.  Liberalism, 
conservatism, and socialism were social structures which could also aid in giving 
a person a sense of worth.  Liberalism is the perception of advantage in having 
individual personal freedoms, of assembly and the press for instance.  This curbs 
the state’s power in favor of the power of the people and hence it is the founding 
principle of many of the revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries.  Socialism is 
the equality of classes and people, instead of personal freedoms promoted by 
                                            
75  Ibid., 156-7., Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural 
France, 1870-1914, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1976), 112.  Weber notes that 
„Renan criticized the German concept of nationhood, as worked out by Herder, Fichte, and 
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76  Hagen Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism, 150, 152. 
77  Ibid., 150. 
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liberalism.  Conservatism is bringing the enlightenment to the government and 
preserving the organic diversity in the state inequality of equals.79  Each of these 
gave people the idea of a common good to which they could contribute hence 
lending them personal legitimacy.  This idea of common good was taken up by 
nationalist causes through the processes described hereafter. 
2. History of Nationalism in Europe 
Since this ideological birth, nationalism in Europe has been a long process 
that has gone through many stages in the various countries it has affected.  
Nationalism was the next step in developing political power after the Church 
power had waned.  The product of nationalism in the past has been an 
identification of self in relation to the nation as opposed to the earlier modes of 
personal validity.  There are two general routes by which nations were developed 
in Europe.  First, in France and England the state developed the nation.  Then in 
Germany and later in eastern Europe the cultural nation developed the state.80  
Despite the different paths, all Europeans began in a similar political situation in 
the middle ages in that the individual began as a member of one of the estates.  
All people were born into these one of these estates, either the aristocracy, the 
middle “class”, or the peasantry, and could rarely change the estate they were 
in.81  The people of the different estates had separate legal rights and duties and 
one was expected to fulfill the role that one had been born into.  The history of 
nationalism is steeped in the history of how the estates gradually faded, social 
classes arose, and subjects became citizens.   
To begin with, France developed a nation from the state.  The elites 
perceived the desirability of making Frenchmen out of peasants.  There had been 
great regional diversity in France during the age of absolutism.  The people did 
                                            
79  Definitions of the ”isms“ are from Hagen Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism, 152-
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not use the same currency, the same units of measure, indeed the same 
language in some cases.  The economist Adolphe Balanqui noted: “Two different 
peoples living on the same land a life so different that they seem foreign to each 
other, though united by the bonds of the most imperious centralization that ever 
existed.”82  This diversity became a source of contention after the Revolution and 
France eventually brought all of its inhabitants together into the nation.83   
The British began a serious pursuit of nationalism in 1803 in response to a 
threat of invasion by the French.  The elites were forced to call upon Britons as a 
whole, and hence nationalized the Welsh, English, Irish, and Scots into British 
citizens.84  In contrast to the French, who eradicated the monarchy in favor of the 
people, the British elite maintained their class structure and led the way to other 
constitutional monarchies in Europe.85  There was still very little meritocratic 
advancement in British politics, and though basic liberal rights were advanced 
and continued to rise in Great Britain, the elites maintained their separation and 
the monarchy maintained the crown. 86 
German nationalism slowly and sporadically began through the middle 
and end of the 19th century.  Though it had some foundations of national 
sentiment going back to the rediscovery of Tacitus’s Germania of 1455, the 
nation did not coalesce until the communications of the industrial revolution 
brought the ideas of nationalism to the people.87  Finally, the German nation we 
know today came about in the 20th century.  “World War I transformed German 
nationalism by giving it emotional depth and tying it to social reform and political 
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87  Hagen Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism, 127-8, 156. 
 31 
entitlement.”88  After the counterrevolution in November 1918, the people were 
mobilized as never before.  They were organized into influential interest groups 
and their voice would be heard.  The eventual rise of the Nazis was a 
consequence of these interest groups and the power they held, driving the 
nationalism of Germany from below.  So what the Nazis created was a new role 
for people allowing the nationalism from below to be accepted from above, as 
described by Peter Fritzsche, a professor of History at the University of Illinois: 
In the years 1933-1945 Germans lived in two worlds.  In the midst 
of the familiar universe of stable links to family, region and social 
milieu, the Nazis constructed a “second world” out of “a network of 
organizations” in which “the traditional criteria of social worth and 
social placement had no validity.89 
Eastern Europe, like Germany, defined their nation culturally.  Though 
they were ruled by emperors until 1918, the roots of national sentiment were 
beginning in eastern Europe through the 18th century, based on the perception of 
common language and a common culture.90  Hagen Schultze, a professor of 
modern German and European History, states in his book States, Nations, and 
Nationalism: 
Identification of the individual with the nation simplified complex 
social and international relationships and clarified the issue of 
loyalty – especially in many Central European countries, where 
governments had frequently changed between the first partition of 
Poland in 1772 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and where 
today’s ruler might be tomorrow’s adversary.91 
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The nations finally arose after national states were created under the Treaty of 
Versailles and Wilsonian “self determination,” though they were not very 
homogenous after their rule under the various Empires.92 
The processes of how these changes came to be for individual people in 
Europe are what is elucidated through the remainder of this chapter.  The 
general process by which a nation develops nationalism is to bring the people to 
identify with the nation instead of some other entity, as we have seen earlier.  
There are several processes which will hence be examined, all of which used 
symbolism to some degree.  Part of this symbolism was the use of architecture, a 
tangible form of art that all could identify with.   
3. National Sentiment 
Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.93 
The role of national sentiment is at the core of nationalism.  In the 
geographical areas discussed here nationalism developed as a product of 
looking to the past and this is what is referred to as national sentiment in this 
thesis.  The sentiment is romantic as well as sentimental, as emphasized by 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, a philosopher who was a significant contributor to the 
political debate during the development of nationalism.  He accentuated the 
romantic in the development of the state during the enlightenment, always 
looking to the past for the answers to national unity.94  Of course these romantic 
notions of the past inevitably used the symbols and architecture of the past as 
objectifications of their philosophy. 
A common development in the rise of sentiment is the imaginings of 
national roots.  This phenomenon occurred in the context of eastern Europe in 
that that area was seen as being contrived by the scholars of western Europe 
during the 18th and 19th centuries.95  Nobles wrote about their trips through 
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eastern Europe and much of the visions of how it was there came from these first 
hand accounts.96  Other authors merely imagined eastern Europe from afar, 
without actually visiting all of the places they discussed, but were nonetheless 
quite influential on how it was perceived from the west.  Rudolph Erich Raspe 
went even further and imagined a fantastic area to the east with only allegorical 
reference to reality.97  All of these authors invented something to a lesser or 
greater degree, and this invention of the “Other” in eastern Europe contributed to 
the later and sometimes simultaneous nationalization of the “We” in western 
Europe.  Of course, while inventing the Other in eastern Europe they were 
inevitably giving the eastern Europeans cultural fuel to fire their own national 
pride.  There are many further examples of how the remainder of Europe used 
their own national history to produce sentiment, which will be illuminated in the 
following sections of the chapter. 
To begin with, Schultze echoes the observation of invention suggesting 
that while the people go to seek their roots, they occasionally even make up their 
roots as Germany expounded on their national root through the rediscovered text 
of Germania.98  In a similar manipulation of national culture, traditional 
ceremonies in France were converted into national character.99  All of this 
contrivance of national character through the use of the past is, at times, a 
manipulation.  Whether intended or not, nationalist movements mold the past to 
meet their present needs.  The vehicles that are used to develop this sentiment 
are the use of Us and Them, The development of a “cult of the soldier,” and the 
use of aesthetics.100  Each of these methods is actually more aesthetic than 
pragmatic, though, and hence the connection to architecture.  These aesthetic 
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means of arguing for a polity, or selling it, can be translated in to architecture or 
indicate how the aesthetics of architecture can affect the mind of a nation. 
a. Use of Us and Them 
There are few more effective ways of bonding together a highly 
disparate people than by encouraging it to unite against its own and 
other outsiders. . . .  It gave the majority of men and women a 
sense of their place in history and a sense of worth.  It allowed 
them to feel pride in such advantages as they genuinely did enjoy, 
and helped them to endure when hardship threatened.  It gave 
them identity.101 
Bringing the people together under one nation also involves 
defining who We are and this leads to defining who the Other is.  The slippery 
slope that results is how much we love ourselves can be translated into how 
much we hate the Other that we have defined ourselves in contrast to.  But all 
cases of the development of nationalism in Europe used some sort of definition 
of the other, whether it was the French use of the heathens within France as well 
as to the east, the British use of the French Catholics to the South, or the 
German and East European use of the Other within. 
Western Europe as a whole defined themselves in terms of their 
difference from eastern Europe.   Eastern Europe was considered to be Oriental 
or Hellenistic, barbaric in comparison to the west.  Hence, as seen earlier, the 
culture of the west defined itself in contrast to the barbarity of the East.102 
France developed their nationalism despite the Otherness of 
France itself.  During their time of assimilation of the various compartments of 
France in the late 19th century, the compartments themselves felt that they were 
being colonized by France.  For instance, there was some resistance put up in 
Brittany to the development of French culture.  They spoke their own language 
and had their own customs and to them the Other was the Frenchman as they 
were the other to France.  The job of France, then, was to turn the tables and 
                                            
101  Linda Colley, Britons, 53. 
102  Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 419.  See especially 7-16 in the introduction. 
 35 
make France into the We and Brittany into the Other.103  They were eventually 
successful in this throughout France, through promotion of France through 
French heritage and creating the new Us in the provinces. 
England began their national quest in a similar fashion; the Other 
was Scotland, Ireland, and Wales.  For instance, Scots, and especially the 
highland Scots, are seen by British as better soldiers and this lent to 
apprehension at accepting them in to politics.  But the wars against the Colonies 
changed the Other and allowed Great Britain to see itself as a whole.  This 
development led to intermarriage between the Celtic and English elites and 
brought homogeny to the island.104   
A further homogenizing agent was the fact that the entire British 
island was anti-French, and additionally anti Catholic.  This of course led to 
difficulties in accepting the Irish that we still see the remnants of today.  These 
two main themes, religious and national Otherness, were seen throughout the 
nationalization of Great Britain.105   It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  after  the  
French were defeated, the Other went away, and there was great turmoil in Great 
Britain over the definition of Britishness.  Hence the development of the fox hunts 
noted earlier.106 
During the interwar year, the eastern Europeans were 
experimenting with nationalism, the society of Europe was turning toward 
isolationist strategies, and this isolationism increased the poverty in the east and 
the feeling of eastern Europe that they were being left out to dry by other nations.  
East Europe was economically tied to exports so they lost a great deal during the 
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Figure 3.   Bismarck Tower at Heidelberg.  From George Mosse, The 
Nationalism of the Masses, Plate 1. 
 
 
 “beggar thy neighbor” years of the 1930s. 107  Furthermore, there was a lack of 
social mobility inherent in the eastern European societies in the post-WWI years, 
and this kept national peasantry from rising in to the ranks of the middle class.  
The gaps in society in eastern Europe were filled by immigrants, Jews, and other 
“non indigenous people,” which lent to some of the hatred of the Other in these 
societies.108  In other words, liberalism and democracy failed and was replaced 
by race and class in the 1920s. 
Of course, there is no better example of the use of Us and Them 
than in the Cold War.  The United States and the Soviet Union both used the 
aesthetic of the evil power on the other side of the fence to bring their people 
under a common cause and motivate them to defense.  This perception drove 
policies and attitudes for decades. 
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b. Nationalism Creates a “Cult of the Soldier” 
Another tool used to create national sentiment was the fallen 
soldier himself.  This myth was created and perpetuated through the use of 
aesthetics, and monuments were used to perpetuate the idea continuously 
between the wars.109  They would show how the nation had survived by 
reflecting on the past before the wars, like the Celtic references of the Bismarck 
towers, (see Figure 3) and by commemorating the war dead of WWI 
contradicting the war guilt placed upon them by the Treaty of Versailles.110  
Simultaneously, they contributed to the commemoration and worship of the 
fallen.  In this way, war monuments not only commemorated the battles and the 
fallen but “provided an example for other generations to follow.”111  The people 
should strive to be like their fallen comrades who had given their lives to the 
cause of the nation in the past.  This is how nationalists mobilized the people 
using the monuments.   
 
The case of these monuments to fallen soldiers is also an interesting example of 
how form superseded function in nationalist architecture, just as it does in church 
architecture.  In the early 20th century, the newly formed National Festival Society 
needed to select the best place to hold its festivals.  A monument (the 
Niederwalddenkmal) was chosen, not for rational or practical reasons, but 
because it was already established in the national liturgy.  The monument had no 
nearby areas to conduct the desired sporting activities and festivals as other 
monuments had, but it was chosen anyway.112 
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Figure 4.   “The Fallen Comrade” German Postcard, WWI.  From George 
Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, 130. 
 
Another way the myth was perpetuated through symbols was 
through cemeteries.  Tangible symbols of death were both moved away from the 
masses and their symbolism was changed.  Cemeteries were moved out of the  
center of towns and hence away from the masses, though this was certainly not 
only for symbolic reasons of nationalism, but for sanitary reasons as well.  The 
churchyards were becoming overcrowded and the smell was beginning to be 
associated with illness.113 
The change of symbolism was that cemeteries became less 
focused on the dead and death, and more focused on life and the perpetuation of 
the myth of the fallen soldier.  Aesthetics contributed by creating less tangible 
attachments to individual deaths, and more to the greater glory of the myth.  For 
instance, the standard cemeteries of lines of headstones were inculcated with 
nature to demonstrate how the dead were going back to the roots of the land, 
which incidentally was a part of the nation.  “The image of the Grim Reaper was 
replaced by the image of death as eternal sleep.  This change in the perception 
of death transformed the Christian cemetery into a peaceful wooded landscape 
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of groves and meadows.”114(See Figure 4)  Furthermore, the heroism in dying for 
ones country was emphasized as mentioned earlier. 
The cult of the fallen was even perpetuated by religious ritual in 
some countries, showing the close ties between the symbols of faith and the 
symbols of nationalism.  “Even during the anti-Christian phase of the French 
Revolution, and the German Wars of Liberation as well, volunteers were often 
blessed in the church before going to join their regiments.”115  Thus, in Europe 
religious symbolism cooperated with the nationalist cause in creating the myth of 
the soldier.  The nationalists used the Christian past like this when they could, 
but essentially had secularized their movement by the end of World War One.116 
c. Use of the Aesthetics of  Battle and the Military 
Another source of national sentiment through this cult is the 
manipulation of the image of battles and the military.  Related to aesthetics, this 
manipulation changes how the soldier and war itself are viewed.  This usage of 
the military is most easily seen in the case of Nazi Germany, but glimpses can 
also be seen in the remainder of Europe as they were nationalizing. 
To begin with, by the 1890s there was a change in France from an 
attitude of “their army” to one of “our army.”117  As the people were nationalized 
and the idea of the citizen soldier came to fruition the military was one way that 
Frenchmen identified with being French.  Of course one of the reasons for this 
new ownership of the military was the fact that the barracks were also used as a 
source of education in France.  It was one of the places where the peasantry 
could learn to read and understand the common tongue of French, which brought 
France together as a nation in the late 19th century.  In this way, people of the 
schools and the army were agents of national change in France.118 
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There was a similar trend in Britain.  Colley speaks at length about 
the role of the military in nationalizing Britain: “In Great Britain, as in other major 
European powers, it was training in arms under the auspices of the state that 
was the most common collective working-class experience in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries.”119  They educated their population, like the 
French, through the military which had the additional advantage of brining the 
people together in a bond though their mutual service. 
There were also less pragmatic ways that the state used the 
military to build the nation in Britain.  In the cultural realm, “War played a vital role 
in the invention of a British nation after 1707,” when Scotland, England, and 
Wales were linked politically.120  “More than anything else . . . it is the experience 
of recurrent wars that brought these diverse peoples together.”121  So in the 
course of the wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the 
people had found a common bond and this common bond was spread through 
the military, 
Of course the background of battle had always been present in 
British history.  Through the middle ages and the beginnings of nationalism, the 
Britons were a people who are willing to fight for their country, and have largely 
defined themselves through fighting.  This trend continues for the Britons to this 
day, and therefore contributes heavily to the development of their national 
sentiment.122   
This sentiment for battle translated into a cult of manliness in the 
British, which was perpetuated even in times of peace.  During times of relative 
peace in the middle and late 19th century, British manliness was demonstrated in 
the fox hunt.  This activity practiced by nobles and potential officers was seen as 
a virtue that will translate in to combat.  For instance, the horsemanship involved 
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was considered to be indicative of the ability to participate in a cavalry charge, 
and sometimes the fox was even equated to the Frenchman.123 
In Germany the trend of warfare and manliness translating to 
nationalism went to an even greater degree as “war mongering encouraged 
nation building.”  The Prussian heritage of manliness through battle was present 
throughout their earlier history and took hold as their cultural heritage in the early 
20th century.  At that time, World War I took a place in German national history as 
a transitional time for their nationalism as they developed from a nation of the 
state to a cultural nation.124  Ties to the crown declined as the feeling of being a 
nation of Germans arose.  There was a cult of the soldier in Germany.125 
As a corollary to the direct military role, there were affects of the 
war for civilians on the home front that contributed to nationalism.  For instance, 
the potato and bread lines during the war promoted national unity as the shared 
hardship of the trenches was transmuting the national sentiment of the soldier.126  
Shared hardship, then, certainly brings people together and this was one of the 
tools that the people striving for nationalism used to create sentiment in the 
populace. 
Finally, after the Second World War, the Soviets used the 
aesthetics of their soldiers to create national monuments commemorating their 
battles of the war.  As in the Nazi case, these monuments served as gathering 
places for national festivals, and were built all around the country, like the 
Bismarck Towers of Germany the century before.127 
d. Use of Aesthetics                                             
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The most interesting way in which nationalism manifested national 
sentiment was through the use of all kinds of aesthetics including art, 
architecture, and maps.  The case of eastern Europe is a good general case in 
the study of aesthetics in nationalism.  There was a desire during the first years 
of the twentieth century in this area, during their burgeoning nationalism, to 
express a feeling of political injustice and many times this manifested itself in art.  
Ivan Berend, a professor of History at the University of California and prolific 
author on eastern Europe, discusses how they were seeking liberalization from 
their hegemonic regimes.   
Sociopolitical rebellion . . . was often more possible in the arts than 
in politics in the nondemocratic, oppressive and even despotic 
political regimes of Central and Eastern Europe.  Rebellious artistic 
groups sought to play a direct political role in mobilizing people and 
destroying old values that they considered false and hypocritical.128   
In other words, after the Central and Eastern German nations were freed from 
the rule of empires, during the 1930s, there was somewhat of a crisis in art that 
illustrates this desire for change.   
In addition to the artists themselves, the new dictators, and especially Hitler and 
Stalin, were intent upon changing art to meet their political ends.  They enforced 
strict edicts on what was considered good art and oppressed those who 
expressed themselves differently.  The new art would be classicism and heroic 
monumentalism as directed by the central powers.129  This strict  enforcement  of  
artistic  style  reflected  the  politics  of  the  time.    In  an interesting stylistic 
twist, Stalin later tried to homogenize his culture by creating a new (not classic) 
style of Socialist Realism.130 
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The British host an example of the use of fine art to generate 
national sentiment, in this case as a satirical gouge against the perennial 
enemies, the French.  In the engraving Calais Gate by William Hogarth (See 
Figure 5) the artist illustrated the “French disadvantages: lacking real liberty, their 
wealth was bound to be superficial and grossly ill distributed, their religion 
entangled forever in superstition.”131  The viewer saw ugly people including some 
confused nuns who have found the image of Christ in a fish, a greedy monk, and 
skinny and effeminate soldiers.132   
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Figure 6.   British Cavalry Officers.  From Linda Colley, Britons, 136. 
 
 
The case of the multiple British monarchs from 1625 to 1727 is an 
example of how people attempted to use architecture to further the nation.   
During this time, Britain had a total of seven monarchs, five of whom reigned for 
less than 13 years.  In their desire to assert themselves and their country 
politically, they each tried to create a palace in their own style.  This multiplicity of 
styles resulted in a confusion of designs for the architecture of Britain.  As Linda 
Colley, a Yale professor of History and author on British history, said, “The British 
monarchy’s failure to associate itself with one particular set of splendid buildings 
had practical as well as symbolic repercussions.”133  The repercussions were 
that the lack of splendor in architectural style was accompanied by a lack of 
splendor in the royal courts.  The large royal families simply did not have enough 
space to live separate form one another, and the relatively small palaces did not 
have enough room for an opulent court.134  Hence, no opulent buildings and no 
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opulent court, leading to a less formidable appearance to the other nations of the 
world.  
A further aesthetic transformation in Britain was seen in the military.  
The uniforms of the officers and men were transformed between 1780 and 1815 
“from peacock male to somber man of action.”135(See Figure 6) They initiated an 
aesthetic transformation that was followed by the remainder of Europe.  They got 
rid of the powdered wigs, padded shoulders and high-heeled boots for more 
practical wear.  The aesthetic was giving way to the practical and changing the 
fashion itself as the people who wore it changed in attitude.136  As the people 
nationalized and pressed for the rights of the individual in the nation, the uniforms 
of the military reflected a trend away from the pomp of court to the necessity of 
the soldier. 
Several authors note how maps are used to nationalize peoples.137  
Again, in the context of western Europeans identifying the east as the Other in 
order to define themselves, they make maps and more importantly they color 
them.  The coloring of the maps signifies to what culture each country belongs.  
To wit, they signify where the boundary is between eastern and western 
Europe.138  They use strategic coloring on a piece of paper to show where “they” 
are and that they are a definable people in a definable place.  Of course the line 
is more blurred than a map maker would like.  Eastern Europeans do not fit into 
the colorings that the maps simplify pictorially for the western Europeans, and 
this shows how symbolism was more important than geographic accuracy. 
Additionally,  the French used maps to define themselves.  The role 
of the schools in developing Frenchmen out of peasants was, among other 
things, to teach them about what France was.  To do this, maps were distributed 
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throughout France and “they inculcated all with the image of the national 
hexagon.”139   
This indicates another change that brought aesthetics to the 
masses.  Industrialization brought photography and the printing press and 
allowed the mass production of nationalist propaganda.  Mass media in England 
for instance, like the French production of educational maps, brought nationalist 
propaganda to the people in their developmental years of the early 19th 
century.140 
It is argued by some that the “transformation of the public spirit was 
facilitated by rebellious, transforming art.”141  However, Fritzsche offers a word of 
warning about how far this argument can be taken.  “Public spectacles such as 
May Day and the Nuremburg Rallies did not create Nazis out of Germans.  Social 
identities cannot be fashioned on a potter’s wheel.”142  Aesthetics have played an 
important part in the history of nationalism, then, but as stated in the beginning of 
this chapter they are only one of innumerable causes. 
e. German Nationalist Style 
Due to their references to history in seeking national sentiment, the style of 
nationalism became to some degree historical.143  “Madame de Staël in On 
Germany complained that as a city Berlin was altogether too new, as new as the 
excessive military of Prussia.  There was ‘too little past’ in Berlin, she 
complained, nothing Gothic!  ‘One sees no evidence of former times.’”144  So it 
was seen by the nationalists, with not enough attention to history that would unite  
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Figure 7.   Hitler examining an architectural model of Linz.  From Frederic 
Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics.145 
 
 
the people, while versing that rhetorically in a quest for the new.  The new art 
would look back to the past. 
Hitler, for instance, pursued a historic style for architecture, and 
remarked that humanity was never so close to antiquity in its appearance and 
sensibilities than today.146  His quest for a national style would drive him to 
distraction as he spent many hours before and even during the war 
contemplating new designs for Berlin, Munich, and Linz.147  Though to many 
architects of the time, Germany was the holder of the best in modern design, the 
Bauhaus, Hitler paid little attention to modern aesthetics, even though many 
                                            
145  Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 2003). 
146  Quoted in Armand Dehlinger, Architektur der Superlative (Unpublished MS, Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, Munich), 33 cited in George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 184. 
147  Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics, 351-385. 
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buildings in the Reich were built in the style.148  Neo-classicism would be the 
style of nationalism. 
All architecture was linked to the past, even new architecture, and 
this is most starkly exemplified in the new monuments of nationalism.  The intent 
of the monuments for the nationalists was threefold.  They would act as a 
gathering space to promote nationalism, visually contribute to the national liturgy, 
and perpetuate the cult of the fallen soldier, making him into a figure to be 
emulated.  Ernst Moritz Arndt and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, architects in the Third 
Reich, both advocated building romantic national monuments.149  They should 
reflect on Germany’s great history, whether they directly imitate the style or 
merely allude to it.  This allusion is demonstrated by many of the architects of the 
time who take cues from history, and creating a new style with the roots of one or 
more older ones. 
One example of the amalgamation of multiple historic styles is the 
architecture of Wilhelm Kreis, the builder of 500 of the nationalist “Bismarck 
Towers,” monuments scattered throughout the German landscape “in praise of 
the chancellor who had brought about German unity.”  Kreis advocated a 
German national style that was not too classical.  They must establish their own 
style, he thought, and he did this by combining the classical and the Saxon 
traditions.150  The resulting towers were reminiscent of the Saxon piles of stone 
that they used as burial mounds, being massive, simple and aesthetically heavy. 
Another example of the combination of historic styles is the , a nationalist 
monument built at the turn of the century to commemorate the one hundredth 
anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig, which is a combination of the classical and 
an ancient pyramid.  It uses monumental form to make an impression   on   the   
visitor,   like   the   Bismarck   towers,    but    without    any representation of a 
                                            
148  George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 186. 
149  Ibid., 33-34. 
150  Ibid., 36-37. 
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specific individual.151  The use of statues of individual historic figures had been 
commonplace up to this point, but the nationalist drive for each German being 
essentially united to all others in “germanness” lent to the new style.   
The new style of the architecture of nationalism was most starkly 
expressed in the new monuments, using classical styles to reflect back on what it 
was to be German.  This historical reference through massive architecture 
provided not only a visual symbol of the constructive power of the Reich, but a 
place for national worship of the myth of the fallen soldier. (See Figure 8)  
An interesting postscript to this discussion is a demonstration of 
how style can be interpreted by the viewer and meaning can be reassigned.  The 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal, was eventually adopted as a symbol of the DDR, of the 
fact that Russians and Germans had fought side-by-side during the revolution.152  
This is a demonstration of how some aesthetic principles can have bad results.  
The removal of individual representation was bad for the longevity of the 
nationalist reading of this monument.  “Monuments survive all times and the fury 
of all enemies, but they will be lifeless unless the history of the nation remains 
alive within the soul of the people.”153 
4. Conclusion - Nationalism and Symbolism 
So nationalism is a fine example of how aesthetics can be used to unite a 
mass of people; as the church had done it, so would the nationalists.  The use of 
symbols was a part of how they intended to unite the people.  As mentioned 
before, “Symbols were visible, concrete objectifications of the myths in which the 
people could participate.”154  They participated not only through the festivals 
mentioned earlier, but in everyday life through the ‘participation’ of walking 
through streets lined with nationalist banners or working in examples of the 
national  architecture.   “Politics  and  life  must  penetrate  each  other,  and  this  
                                            
151  Ibid., 65. 
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Figure 8.   Völkerschlachtdenkmal at Leipzig.  From George Mosse, The 
Nationalization of the Masses , Plate 11. 
 
 
means that all forms of life become politicized.  Literature, art, architecture, and 
even our environment are seen as symbolic of political attitudes.”155 
                                            
155  Ibid., 215. 
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Symbolism was the only way to express the universe of myths that were 
being created by the nationalist cause, and the symbolism “must incorporate the 
aesthetic and the artistic . . .” and furthermore, “symbols, the objectification of 
popular myths, gave people their identity.”156  So it is shown that nationalism as 
the new religion needed symbols to solidify its cause.  As Mosse said, 
. . . the aesthetics of politics was the force which linked myths, 
symbols, and the feelings of the masses. . . .  A concept of beauty 
objectified the dream world of happiness and order while it enabled 
men to contact those supposedly immutable forces which stand 
outside the flow of daily life.157 
D. ARCHITECTURE AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT IN EUROPE 
Throughout history the powerful have tried to use aesthetic tools to 
manipulate the people to their political ends.  Religious power is certainly no 
exception to this rule, as shown here.  They have used the methods described 
above to further their political ends to some success and each generation seems 
to have done well in building on the lessons of the past.  The connection between 
aesthetics and politics observed through this history is through its connection to 
national sentiment and the power of the population that could be manipulated 
with this tool. 
This desire for nationalization was caused by a perceived benefit to all of 
the European population.  The elites saw the benefit of bringing the people under 
a common cause of the new religion of nationalism.  The people then had a 
moral background to be mobilized economically or militarily in support of the 
nation.  The common man saw the benefit of the gain of rights.  If everyone was 
now a Frenchman, for instance, then the elites would have a harder time reaping 
all the gains of the peasantry.  Furthermore, the social mobility provided by a 
meritocratic system meant that one’s children had far greater opportunity as well.  
Even in the less meritocratic case of Great Britain, this is the case.  Being 
citizens and not subjects was a profound transition, and meant that Nation 
                                            
156  Ibid., 7. 
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became more powerful than class.158  The education of the people, as 
exemplified in France earlier was an additional benefit for the masses as well as 
the elites.  The only people that lost out seem to be the aristocracies, who no 
longer have much of a say in politics. 
We have seen the historical advance of power and how it led to 
nationalism and a desire for an increase in national sentiment.  In the era of 
Christian power in Europe, churches were the symbol of power, as was 
illustrated by the financing of St. Peter’s basilica in Rome.  The Church used this 
architecture and symbols of the history of the Church to bring the people of 
Europe together under one religion.  The challenges to these symbols illustrate 
the importance that they had on their supporters and opponents both.  The 
Protestants of the Reformation both destroyed and restored church artifacts, and 
the Ottomans reestablished a church as a mosque.  Finally, in later years, the 
nationalists adopted the same methods of destruction and rebuilding symbols to 
advance their new secular religion.  It is important to recognize how these 
aesthetic methods played a role in advancing power through history, as the same 
methods are used by secular power.  Architecture is the art that emphasized how 
important aesthetics were to the advancement of ideas, because in architecture 
there was always a battle between whether the functionality or aesthetics of a 
building were primary.  In the architecture of the ideologies, as we have seen, 
function was subordinate to form demonstrating the importance of aesthetics to 
political thought.  In fact, in the case of religious and political architecture the 
function is aesthetic and hence form and function are one. 
The development of nationalism called for a new level of activation of the 
population, as opposed to the direct control that was seen before.  The question 
of how people are nationalized has been addressed here from several angles: 
that of the use of “We” and the “Other,” the “cult of the soldier,” and a deep look 
at the role of aesthetics in developing national sentiment.  These processes are 
just part of what may cause a person to become a nationalist but they are 
                                            
158  Linda Colley, Britons, 312-313. 
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universal in the case of nationalism in Europe.  The identification of the Other is 
especially important in looking at future cases of nationalism because if it is taken  
too far, it can result in racial hatred and be detrimental to society.  Only in 
Germany did it become genocidal, but this case illustrates how careful we must 
be.159 
In the pursuit of the question, how do architecture and the rhetoric of 
politics relate, we conclude from the historical examination that the link is through 
a desire to increase national sentiment.  As the people gain power over the 
powerful through liberalization, the powerful desire to control that power.  They 
have used aesthetics and the aesthetics of architecture to pursue that goal.  
Architecture is a very public and permanent art, as we have seen, though the 
rhetoric that it generates may or may not support the ideas it was created to 
embody.160  The powerful, eventually the government, use these symbols to 
increase national sentiment then, in pursuit of their own ends. 
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IV. ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICS IN BERLIN AND 
PRAGUE:  POST 1989 
We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us 
Winston Churchill.161 
 
The architecture of the twentieth century has gone through dramatic 
change to mirror the changes of polity.  Stalin embarked upon a change of 
architecture in Russia while modern theorists in Germany were developing a new 
“International” style for the free world.  Hitler planned massive changes to the 
architecture of Germany to reflect his great Reich and diverted resources from 
the war to accomplish this.162  In his own words, while speaking over a model of 
a plan for the intended cultural capitol of Linz, “The funds which I shall devote to 
these will vastly exceed the expenditures which we found necessary for the 
conduct of this war.”163   
In the inter-war period, the Soviets had tried to enforce their architectural 
style upon the newly subjugated Central European states, or “people’s 
democracies.”  This was viewed by most of the Central European states as an 
imposition on their national sovereignty, but they were not given an option in 
most cases as the Soviets wanted to use their aesthetic methods to spread 
communism as described in Chapter III.164  This architecture was everywhere, 
and was most prevalent in the new housing projects of the post-Stalinist era, but 
extended to most projects in varying degrees. 
                                            
161  Winston Churchill in debate on rebuilding the House of Commons, 1943, quoted in 
Deyan Sudjic with Helen Jones, Architecture and Democracy, 8. 
162  The various programs of Nazi Germany to implement architectural change in part 
through slave labor is described in  Paul B. Jaskot, The Architecture of Oppression, and Frederic 
Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics. 
163 Hitler quoted in Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics, xii. 
164 The threat to national sovereignty is explained in Anders Åman, Architecture and 
Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era, 72-73.  The expansion of the architecture 
throughout the people’s democracies is described in Chapter IV of the same book. 
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The Democratic societies meanwhile embraced modernism, and artistic 
freedom.  With this in mind, the question here is what will the new leaders of 
Eastern and Central Europe do with their architecture after the great political 
change of 1989?  How will the government and the elites building their 
architecture express their own political views and the views of the new society 
through the built form?  We will examine these questions through the case 
studies of Berlin and Prague in the post-communist era. 
A. BERLIN 
The example of eastern Berlin is most apropos for several reasons.  First, 
they are simply constructing a great deal of buildings.  Eastern Berlin has been 
building a staggering amount of private and public buildings through the past 
decade which makes it a target rich environment for architectural study.165  The 
reason for this is partially due to the money coming from her big (rich) brother to 
the West, and indeed some of the most prominent structures are in the 
government sector due to the relocation of the Federal government from Bonn to 
Berlin.  Another part of the reason for the architectural change in Berlin is due to 
the nature of architecture as an art.  Urban architecture is unique in that it is the 
only art that requires the patron to destroy a former piece of art in order to create 
a new one.  Berlin, then, is unique in that when the wall came down, room was 
freed to build. 
Another reason that eastern Germany is a good case for study is the large 
amount of debate on her architecture.  There is a vast and varied literature since 
1989 of the many facets of the argument about what should be built in the new 
Germany.  Again, much of this falls in to the realm of the moving Federal 
government.166 
                                            
165 Many architectural and other periodicals discuss the plethora of work that has been 
completed in Berlin since 1989, some of which are noted in the bibliography here.  A brief survey 
of most of the important new works may be found in Martin Kieren, New Architecture Berlin 1990-
2000 (Berlin: Jovis, 1998). 
166  The literature ranges from architectural magazines to the political periodicals and books 
dedicated to the subject.  See the bibliography of this thesis for further works, but most influential 
to this work have been the books of George Mosse and a survey of Berlin by Michael Wise. 
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A final reason for Germany’s usefulness as a case is her Nazi past.  Due 
to the horrors of World War Two committed by German citizens, there is a 
tentative nature about German politics, and this nature is reflected in their 
architecture.167  This is doubly the case when observing the debate around and 
construction of her public architecture in Berlin.  In this way the architecture of 
Berlin has been affected by the history of the nation as it is perceived 
ideologically by her citizens.  This actually perpetuated itself in the Soviet era by 
allowing greater transformation of architecture in her center in comparison to 
Prague.  There are many examples of how Socialist Realism infiltrated the center 
of East Berlin.168 
The German case, in sum, is an accelerated study of the results of the 
political change that took place in the East in 1989.  This acceleration is due to 
her greater financial backing as well as her political background and her intense 
debate over national architecture.  Furthermore, the case lends itself to the study 
of public architecture, as opposed to private, which will be addressed in relation 
to Prague.  The dynamics of private individuals and how their national sentiment 
combines with personal artistic sensibilities contributes a whole new range of 
variables to the discussion of architecture and politics.  These non-public cases 
will not be considered here. 
The cases taken in this study will be from the national architecture of 
Berlin since the fall of the Wall in 1989.  Since that remarkable day, Berlin has 
redesigned herself aesthetically as well as politically, and though she has not 
been able to rid herself of the scar of communist rule, she has made some 
remarkable progress toward a freer architecture to match her freedom in politics.  
Some examples of the redesign of the constucted environment are the redesign 
of the Reichstag, the center of government for the country, the urban design of 
                                            
167  This theme is noted in Michael Wise, “Bonn: Capital of Self-Effacement” in Capital 
Dilemma, as well as Anders Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin 
Era, 99-102. 
168 Consider the Stalinallee which is a massive example of monumentality expressed 
through Socialist Realism, as noted in Anders Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern 
Europe during the Stalin Era, 119-125. 
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the political center of the new government, and the design of the monument to 
the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. 
These three structural examples will be discussed in light of several topics 
which shall pervade each, some of which were discussed in the previous 
chapters.  The themes of architecture and remembrance, internationalism 
through the aesthetic, the aesthetic and political importance of site, and finally 
the relationship of aesthetics to ideology will come in to play to different degrees 
in each example.  The question of national sentiment is again a pervading issue 
in the architecture of Berlin as well.  The concluding paragraphs will then sum up 
the meaning of these themes in light of Berlin’s architectural changes. 
1. Reichstag 
The Reichstag redesign is one of the most obvious design changes in the 
new (and old) capitol of Germany. (Figure 9)  Thus it has received a great 
amount of attention of critics.  The debate over the structure has raged over what 
to do with the gutted shell of a classic piece of German Wilhelmine architecture.  
War damage had left architects with an interesting remnant.  The façade of the 
building stood, though the interior and the roof were a shambles.  So designers  
had to decide whether to rebuild the traditional structure as it was originally, or to 
do a complete redesign of the interior and roof in a different style.169 
Of course the debate was between preservationists on the one side, both 
artistic and theoretical, and the modernists on the other.  Preservationists felt 
that, to one extent or another, the building should be maintained for posterity and 
in some cases restored to its original aesthetic.  It is a standing monument to the 
old Germany which some Germans may want to remember. 
 On the other hand, other Germans do not want to recall the past.  More to 
the point, they don’t want to be perceived as recalling the past.  The Nazi history 
was a horrible past that no one in Germany wants to relive, of course, and no 
one  outside  of  Germany  wants  to  relive  either.    So the modernist designers,  
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Figure 9.   New Reichstag, with glass dome.  Photograph taken by German 
Oberstleutnant Ekkehard Stemmer, May 2004. 
 
 
given the desire to reoccupy the old building wanted to change the building into 
something as different as possible from the old style.  They didn’t want to forget 
the past, but they didn’t want to recall it either.170 
Architecture and remembrance as it generates national identity, as noted 
earlier is a key form in which the art plays in to politics.  This is especially the 
case in eastern Europe and actually anywhere where a major political change 
has taken place.  New political structures tend to change the architecture that 
surrounds them after the political change.  Much to the chagrin of staunch art 
theorists, who sometimes contend that a certain aesthetic inherently represents a 
certain political style, art does not reflect society in that way.  For instance, it may 
seem plausible that modern architecture is free from the constraint of the 
                                            
170 Michael Wise, Capital Dilemma, 1-20. 
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romantic past, and would represent a more liberal view of politics.  This is not 
represented in society, though, as such totalitarians as Stalin and Mussolini used 
modern architecture to represent their causes.171 
The debate over the design of the Reichstag culminated in an international 
design competition for the plan.  This is another indication of how Germany was 
trying to remain politically meek in the design of their building.  It is not unusual 
for parliaments to be designed by natives, and in fact the parliamentary buildings 
of the United States, Finland, Britain, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary were all 
designed by indigenous architects.  Some of these were by a famous designated 
national architect, some by internal competition, and some by international 
competition where local architects won.172  Therefore it would not have been 
unreasonable for Germany to pursue a competition limited to its own architects.  
The choice was another indication of Germany’s somewhat tentative nature 
toward showing national pride. 
The design that won the competition was a modernist redesign of the 
interior and the lost roofline of the structure.  The ideological components read in 
to the design were many.  The new roof would have a glass dome, through which 
the people could walk over the ceiling of the assembly chamber.  This 
represented how the people were superior to the parliament, by virtue of being 
above them.  Additionally, the glass of the dome represented the transparency of 
democracy and indeed of the new Germany as a whole.173  Interestingly, the 
communists had used the same metaphor in one of their buildings right in Berlin.  
The Palace of the Republic had been designed with large expanses of glass to 
represent eastern Germany’s strides toward modern urban culture.174 
                                            
171 As noted earlier this is the theme of Anders Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern 
Europe during the Stalin Era. 
172 Deyan Sudjic with Helen Jones, Architecture and Democracy (Glasgow: Laurence King 
Publishing, 1999) note this in Chapters 1-3. 
173 Elanor Heartney, “Berlin: Future Perfect?” Art in America 88, Iss. 2, (2000), 109. 
174 Michael Wise, Capital Dilemma, 51-53. 
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Figure 10.   Wilhelmine Reichstag as completed in 1894.  From Michael Wise, 
Capital Dilemma, plate 44. 
 
It is obvious then, that a transparent structure does not inherently 
represent the transparency of government.  Nor does it cause the people to 
believe that the government is any more transparent.  The symbolic nature of the 
glass dome of the Reichstag is, in fact, that it was not glass before, it looked 
more like a World War I German helmet. (Figure 10)  It is the change of the 
architecture that people will note, and take that as a change in the attitude of 
those that are building it.175  Those people being the politicians, not the 
architects. 
 This relationship between client and architect has long been understood.  
It is the nature of the architect to create something for the client which will meet 
both aesthetic and practical needs.  The nature of architecture, then, is being the 
most accessible art form that the client (politicians in the case of public 
architecture)  can create.    It  will  be  on  display in the public eye more than any  
                                            





Figure 11.   Memorial to Jewish Holocaust victims, by Peter Eisenman and 
Richard Serra.  From Michael Wise, Capital Dilemma, plate 64. 
 
other expression, and is relatively permanent, in that it is not easily changed.  It is 
no wonder that politicians, more than any other client, take great care in the 
production of architecture.  For them the balance of form and function leans 
heavily to that of form, in some cases to the point that form is function. 
2. Holocaust Memorial 
This case could not be any more obvious than in the design of national 
monuments, as seen during the rise of nationalism.  The design competition for 
the Holocaust memorial could not have had greater symbolic significance and 
therefore received a due amount of political attention.  The selection of the site, 
in the first place, was a politically and emotionally charged one.  The placement 
would have to be central; there would be no hiding from the past.  Surprisingly, 
while the contemplation of the memorial was still taking place, the wall came 
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down, and a great amount of extra land became available.  In fact the site of the 
memorial was moved to a place both near to the Reichstag, the Brandenburg 
Gate and the bunker where Hitler had spent his last hours.176  This kind of 
symbolism was just what Berlin wanted to cathartically dispel the ghost of the last 
World War. 
The actual design of the memorial was significant as well, of course. 
(Figure 11)  A competition was held to select the new design, as was the case 
with all of the examples in this text.  In this case it was an international 
competition and the winner was an American, Peter Eisenman.  The design that 
Eisenman and Richard Serra came up with was of a vast expanse of monoliths 
on a grid which would represent the graves of the Jewish dead.  The actual 
entries of the competition were quite emotionally charged, and speak to the 
degree to which the issue of the design was politically charged.  Possibly the 
most ghoulish design was of a simple container, like a silo, large enough to 
contain the blood of all the Jewish dead.177  Of course Germans wanted to make 
a political statement of responsibility, but not to frighten their children.  
This is an exemplary case of how ideas and aesthetics work together and 
how politics plays a part in the creation of architecture.  Architecture is read by 
the German and the world population, and hence politicians desire to generate 
the correct thoughts through the reading.  They take great care then in ensuring 
that a memorial sends the correct message. 
3. National Political District, Spreebogen 
The German sense of apology is also notable in their design of the new political 
district for Berlin or “government ribbon”.178 (see Figure 12)  Once they had  
decided   to   move   the   capitol  back  from  the provisional  capitol  of  Bonn,  a  
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Figure 12.   Model of Spreebogen design, Berlin.  From Michael Wise, Capital 
Dilemma, plate 27. 
 
 
chronic set of issues were brought back to the forefront of German politics.  
These problems began with the initial design of the provisional political 
headquarters in Bonn in the early 1950s. 
The design of their provisional capitol followed close on the heels of their 
rearmament.  The Germans were still quite tentative in the degree to which they 
wanted to express their nationalism.  This was again brought to the forefront in 
their architecture.  The buildings of the Bonn government were cautious, even 
apologetic.  Some German diplomats, upon seeing the new headquarters, 
thought it may be necessary to let visitors know that the place was a center of 
government and not just a college campus.  The buildings were low and plain, 
with a lot of glass and minimal embellishment.  Art decorating the interiors was 
not dramatic, and more than half of it was by foreign artists, thus avoiding the 
question of whether the art inside would show too much national pride. 179 
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Now, with the design of a new political district in Berlin, the argument for a 
stronger Germany is coming to the fore again.  Some critics say that the new 
designs should not be so apologetic, as they were in Bonn.  In fact, some bluntly 
say that Germany needs to regain her pride, and to express this through her 
architecture.  A new architecture should not be minimalist, but should be bold 
and state the strength of the German nation to the world.  These views have not 
won the day, though they have been heard.180 
The design of central Berlin was through a competition, as the two 
examples before were.  The competition came down to two entries, in fact, which 
represented the two poles of the debate on architecture.  An East German team 
submitted a traditionalist and substantial design for the area which would 
hearken back to the older Germany, while a West German team submitted a 
modern design which was lighter and more open.  The political dialog went on 
much as in the previous examples with the Germans wanting to hide from their 
past or apologize for it.  However, an added political twist was an internal one.  
There was some degree of lobbying for the East German design simply because 
it was East German.  The newly reunited country wanted to welcome their new 
brothers by awarding them the design.  This was not enough to push the jury to 
accept their design in the end, though.181 
Philosophically, the East Germans obviously wanted to make a change 
from the modernist designs of communism, while the West Germans wanted to 
forget that past and were not hampered by a desire to break away from the 
recent occupation of communism.  This is another example of how people 
express their delight with political change in the form of architectural change. 
Another interesting note on the nature of architectural change is a 
comparison to Hitler’s designs for Berlin.  The new design would be a linear area 
cutting through part of Berlin and crossing the Spree River twice symbolically 
stitching together East and West Berlin in a symbolic gesture of urban planning.  
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Hitler similarly had a swath of Berlin which would sweep through the city in a 
grand statement.  Hitler’s design was, of course, much bigger than the current 
design as Hitler had a penchant for doing everything to a huge scale.   Two main 
differences between the designs indicate a departure, though, which is likely 
intentional.  First, the new design is at ninety degrees to the fascist design.  
Second, the new design is in a modernist style, while Hitler’s plan was to be 
grand and classical.  This is again an indication of how design style change 
expresses a separation from a past governmental structure.182 183 
Though the transparency of the modern architectural design indicated a 
transparency of government, some Germans still opine that the architecture is 
too overbearing.  In fact, some who visit the political district say that the 
architecture is quite powerful and looks like an expression of German prowess in 
architecture and pride of their accomplishment.184 
4. Conclusion – Aesthetics and Power in Berlin 
These three examples from a joined Berlin illustrate how fundamental 
changes of politics affect the arts and architecture of a city.  The architecture of a 
nation is perceived by many as a statement of its politics, which is why the 
Germans have been so concerned over the image they will portray in their new 
capitol.  The underlying themes through this discourse have been architecture 
and remembrance, internationalism through the aesthetic, the aesthetic and 
political importance of site, and finally the relationship of aesthetics to ideology. 
National  sentiment through architecture and remembrance came to light 
in each of the examples, but most vividly in the Holocaust memorial design.  This 
monument is obviously a source of remembrance and the debate on the subject 
is what, in fact, the Germans want to remember and more to the point what the 
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August 22, 2004.  The Colonel said that though he sees the transparency of the buildings as a 
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want the world to see them as remembering.  This topic showed through in the 
government district and Reichstag design as well.  The Germans wanted to 
demonstrate through their architecture that they remembered their heritage (for 
the people of Germany) and that they would not repeat their mistakes (for the 
rest of the world). 
In the vein of humility, the Germans also dealt with their design in an 
international arena.  The designs were all up for international competition, and 
indeed two of the three mentioned here were eventually won by foreigners, the 
Reichstag by an Englishman, and the memorial by an American.  Furthermore, 
there was a great deal of discussion about accepting an East German design, to 
symbolically include their eastern brothers in the new designs. 
The symbolic aesthetic importance of site was most prominently displayed 
in the example of the Holocaust memorial, and I shall not reiterate here, but there 
was also precedent in the design for the government district.  The mirroring of 
and separation from Hitler’s designs for Berlin were certainly recognized as 
important attributes to the architects in the competition as well as the politicians 
who finally decided on the design. 
The final theme that bears mention here is the relationship of aesthetics to 
ideology.  It has been illustrated by each example how the ideology of politicians 
of the present affect the design of the architecture of their time.  Though some 
believe that one aesthetic inherently relates to an ideology, it is simply not so.  
The Germans have simply used their designs to separate themselves from their 
fascist and communist past, while maintaining a link with their cultural history. 
Berlin is a new old city as are many in eastern Europe and burgeoning 
democracies throughout the world.  Though no one argues that architecture can 
cause democracy, these examples show how politicians use aesthetics to 
remember and to separate from a political past.  The public debate on the subject 
then illustrates that the citizens are a part of this philosophy and desire their 
politics to be reflected in their structures that will represent their city and their 
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nation to the world.  Their national sentiment is improved by their national 
architecture, and they want to ensure that the correct sentiment is expressed to 
the rest of the world. 
B. PRAGUE 
Prague has not had the profound change of public architecture that 
reflected the change of government in Berlin, but there has been significant 
construction in the city since the Velvet Revolution if 1989.  The private 
companies that have elected to build in the city have left a different democratic 
mark on the city than in the public example of Berlin, though, as one would 
expect with the difference in architectural clients. 
The client of a piece of architecture is as important to the design of the 
building as the architect, as has been demonstrated in several examples 
throughout Prague.  The client, in this case more private concerns than public, 
has a vision of a project and holds the purse strings and the final say on the 
artistic merit of a building.  Additionally, both the architect and the local building 
codes have no small amount of influence on the eventual form of a building.  So 
the interplay between these opposing human forces is the environment from 
which a building springs forth. 
Hence the democratic design of the buildings in Prague.  As new investors 
come to invest in the new Czech Republic, some of them want to build and work 
in Prague, and others erect buildings as only as an investment.  These investors 
make their mark through the construction of the new structures of Prague and the 
people  will  have  control of this through government regulation as stated before.   
Additionally, the public has become more vehement in their attitudes about what 
they want to see in Prague, expressing their opinions about where they want 
their aesthetics to lead.185 
1. Prague Architecture 
                                            
185 Public opinions on the development of Prague will be further elucidated throughout the 
chapter.  See especially the references to the public debate in the section “Post 1989 
Architecture.” 
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Prague has basically developed, like most European cities, as a set of 
concentric rings.  The central core is the oldest construction, including examples 
of Gothic, Renaissance, Romanesque and other historical styles of architecture.  
The next ring is one of more modern architecture and examples of communist 
architecture, and the outer ring contains much of the post communist 
suburbanization.186 
Damage to Prague during the Second World War was minimal, especially 
when contrasted to that in Berlin.  Additionally there have been few natural 
disasters to alter the architecture of the city.  This left much of the urban 
character of the city intact and makes the national citizen more attached to the 
skyline.  Furthermore, there have been few interventions into the cityscape on 
the part of the past rulers of Prague.  “The worst [architectural] ‘massacre’ that 
Prague has suffered was actually brought about toward the end of the 19th 
century by its own city officials.”  That was the time when the city officials decided 
to widen the streets of the old Ghetto in a similar, though smaller, fashion to the 
intervention in Paris.187 
This relatively unadulterated cityscape was taken over by the communists, 
and they made no radical changes either.  There was some destruction to make 
way for communist structures, though, like the demolition of the Tesnov railway 
station. 
[The Tesnov railway station] was truly an international attraction.  
The reason for razing the station was so clear and rational that 
even the . . . preservation groups could hardly counter it: It stood 
close to the Communist Part Central Committee building and thus 
                                            
186 For a discussion of the rings of Prague Architecture see Ludek Sýkora, “Changes in the 
internal spatial structure of post-communist Prague,” GeoJournal 49 (1999), p. 79-89.  Sýkora 
actually cites five separate rings in his article, but they fall in to the categories listed in this text.  
There is also a discussion of the history of Prague urbanization in Michal Kohout, Vladimír 
Slapeta, and Stephan Templ, Prague: 20th Century Architecture , 1st English ed. (Praha; New 
York: Zlatý rez; Wien; Springer, 1999), 1-16. 
187 Daniel Kummermann, “City’s Architecture has Endured War, but will it Survive Freedom?” 
The Prague Post (March 1, 1995).  The intervention in this case was not nearly as extensive as 
the one in Paris. 
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blocked what could be a very convenient parking lot.  Adding insult 
to injury, the cleared area was never used.188 
One of the most significant and controversial works perpetrated by the 
communist regime was the construction of the panelak housing in the outer ring.  
These were concrete prefabricated pre-stressed panels assembled into housing 
blocks for the people.  The communist assumption of equality of the workers 
meant that doctors may live next to a newly released convict.  This created an 
interesting dynamic from the capitalist point of view, as the result was nothing like 
the debacle of some inner city housing projects on 1970’s U.S.A.189  They were 
where everyone lived, and though they are not the most sought after real estate 
in Prague, there is still no poor social stigma associated with living in the 
panelak.190 
The panelak are examples, in fact, of how Soviet Realism was accepted 
more readily in Prague than in Berlin.  Though there was only one significant 
example of the style in the downtown area, that of the Hotel International, the 
modern style of Soviet architecture can be seen in the outskirts of the city in 
these housing areas.  The reason that the new style was more widely accepted 
in Czech than in the DDR was two fold.  First, the Prague architectural 
community had embraced modern architecture, more specifically cubism, as a 
style of their own before they were occupied by the Soviets.  In this way, Socialist 
Realism, a more modern style, was more acceptable than in the DDR where the 
national style had gone from the Wilhelmine to classicism to the neoclassicism of 
Hitler.191  Second, the architecture of the central city, having survived the war, 
                                            
188 Ibid. 
189 Note specifically St. Louis’ Pruitt Igoe projects that were torn down in 1972 after they 
became the example of how social decay was perpetuated by architecture.  Many design flaws 
contributed to disuse, as well as vandalism and other crimes in the complex. 
190 Sean Hanley, “Concrete Conclusions: the discrete charm of the Czech panelak,” Central 
Europe Review (v. 0, no. 22, 22 February, 1999) 
191 This progression can be seen in George Mosse, The Nationalism of the Masses.  The 
nationalists use the Bismarck Towers to begin with then progress to the more neoclassical 
monuments mentioned in Chapter III. 
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was left alone, so the heart of the city was not disturbed by Socialist Realism as 
East Berlin was.192 
2. Post 1989 Architecture 
Due to this history and the lack of architectural destruction the citizens of 
Prague are concerned about their architectural pieces as well as the character of 
the city.  They seek maintenance of their urban character through a development 
of appropriate architecture in their city.  This is where the debate begins for 
Prague.  What is an appropriate style, placement, or mass for new additions to 
the cityscape?  And more vehemently, what is inappropriate? 
There have been several government agencies that have taken a role in 
preserving the character of Prague and hence determining what is appropriate 
and forbidding what is not.  The mayor of Prague formed a council for 
architecture planning and preservation in the 1990s.  In addition there is a city 
monument protection office that works with the State Institute for Protection of 
Historical Monuments, and a state listing of “heritage buildings.”193  Ludek 
Sýkora, a lecturer at Prague’s Charles University and Prolific author on the 
subject of post-communist urban development stated, “the entire core is an urban 
historic reserve protected by law.  The protection involves [the] streetscape and 
over one third of all buildings in the core.”194 
In addition to government protection, there are public interest groups that 
lobby these government agencies on their opinions on Prague architecture.  One 
such group is the Society for Old Prague, who professes thoughtful design for 
new buildings as well as preservation of the past.  “They did not aim to renounce 
modern architecture but wanted it to be harmonious with the historical 
surroundings.”195 
                                            
192 This dilemma between Czechoslovakia and the DDR is noted in Anders Åman, 
Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era, 66. 
193 These agencies are mentioned in David Friday, “Protecting the Past,” The Prague Post 
(October 16, 2002) in reference to how citizen preservation groups interact with the government. 
194 Ludek Sýkora, “Changes in the Internal Spatial Structure of Post-communist Prague,” 84. 
195 David Friday, “Protecting the Past,” The Prague Post (October 16, 2002) 
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In fact there has been a significant amount of modernization in Prague in 
addition to the preservation efforts.  As Sýkora notes: 
In the 1990s, the three most visible processes of urban change in 
Prague have been (1) the commercialization of the urban core, (2) 
the revitalization of some inner city neighborhoods, which has taken 
the form of commercialization and gentrification, and (3) residential 
and commercial suburbanization in the outer city.196 
This modernization is worrisome to the interest groups involved, but not 
antithetical.  As one Czech architect said, “we need to defend and preserve the 
history we have.  At the same time it makes no sense to build copies of old 
buildings.”197  This sentiment is mirrored by a second architect who states 
“Prague cannot stay as a place where tourists come and say, ‘Oh, this is what 
European cities looked like hundreds of years ago.””198  Basically, the architects 
agree that there needs to be a plan for the future of Prague, though it does not 
yet seem to exist.199 
One problem in developing this plan is in the nature of capitalization of the 
Czech Republic.  The architecture that has been built has been office space for 
foreign investors as well as some development of living quarters for the more 
affluent population.  The problem Czechs have with foreign investors is that they 
are not generally concerned with maintaining the architectural flavor of Prague.  
“Decisions made by people thousands of miles away are usually more focused 
on return on investment than on the look of a building that they might never 
see.”200 
There has been renovation of existing buildings as well as new 
construction.  The renovation projects have ranged from strict renovations of 
                                            
196 Ludek Sýkora, “Changes in the Internal Spatial Structure of Post-communist Prague,” 83. 
197 Architect Jan Kasl quoted in Frank Forrest, “Standing Still,” The Prague Post (November 
20, 2002) 
198 Architect Milan Urban quoted in ibid. 
199 This sentiment is noted by Jakob Cigler in Frank Forrest, “Standing Still,” as well as other 
architects throughout the article. 
200 Frank Forrest, “Standing Still” 
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historical sites to interior redesigns of classic structures, to change their use but 
not appearance, to new additions to historic buildings.201  Some of this 
renovation is still a concern for the preservationists of Prague’s character though.  
For instance, “the construction of attic flats constitutes a creeping but ultimately 
massive change of Prague’s ancient roofline.  The adaptations often involve the 
addition of new windows or skylights which . . . have damaged roofs dating back 
to the 14th century.”202 
The area of debate in the city is in the urban core, for the most part, as the 
people see that most historic core as the area where character should be 
maintained.  Ironically, though, the center of town has diminished in Czech 
character since the invasion of capitalism into the society.  The tourist industry 
has taken this central area that was representative of Prague Architecture and 
turned it in to something kitschier.  Regular Prague shops have been replaced by 
a mix on high-priced hotels, souvenir shops, and restaurants.  People are seen 
wearing pictures of Mozart or Franz Kafka on t-shirts.203   As a matter of fact, 
some residents are afraid to go in to Wenceslas Square at night due to the 
proliferation of drug dealers and prostitutes that come out.204 
Vlado Milunic, co-architect of the famed “Dancing Building” in Prague, is 
not enthusiastic about some of the changes since 1989.  He opines that the 
capitalist architecture can be as bad as the communist architecture, saying “the 
construction of soulless office blocks, supermarkets, industrial zones, and 
colonies of vulgar little houses is just as debilitating as the Communist-era 
construction of giant housing estates, culture palaces, and motorways.”205 
                                            
201 Some examples are Langhans Palace in Prague 1, and Mueller’s villa in Stresovice 
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Wire (March 15, 2004). 
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3. The Nationale Nederlanden Building (Dancing Building) 
Arguably the most famous post-1989 building in Prague is the Dancing 
building, a work of private architecture designed by an American as well as a 
Czech architect, and funded by a Dutch investor.  So the obvious question is: 
what could this building possibly have to do with Czech national sentiment?  The 
answer is best articulated in terms of a past example: 
At one public presentation at Mánes, Tomáš Notovný, the grandson 
of the man who built Mánes, said that when his grandfather built 
Mánes people hated it, they were outraged; they said he was killing 
the city.  He said, “I think this building will be the same . . . People 
will hate it for two to three years, but if a foreigner comes and says 
he hates it they will slap his face.206 
Though there have been no reports of face slapping as a result of 
architectural debate in Prague, this sentiment seems to have held true.207  
People like the building and it’s representation of the city and the republic, as has 
been shown in the past. 
Through this historical background of the city, there remained an empty lot 
as one of the chief intersections of the city.  Perhaps it is an appropriate reminder 
of the legacy of communist neglect that the corner remained empty since World  
 
War Two when the previous structure was demolished by an Allied bomb.  The 
communists never created a feasible design for the area and hence it remained 
in neglect until their fall.208 
 When the design team of Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic entered the 
scene with financial investment of the Dutch firm Nationale-Nederlanden, there 
had  already  been  several  proposals  for  the  site,  including some form Milunic  
                                            
206 Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic, Fialova, Irena, ed., Dancing Building (Prague, CZ: Zlatý 
Rez, 2003), 75. 
207 Examples of Czech satisfaction with the Dancing Building are numerous.  See the quote 
below from the president of the Society for Old Prague. 
208 Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic, Fialova, Irena, ed., Dancing Building, 39-43 
 75 
 
Figure 13.   Nationale Nederlanden Building, Prague (left) in context with a 
neighboring building.  From Maggie Toy, ed., Beyond the Revolution. 209 
 
 
himself.210  None of them were what was needed in Prague: a serious design 
with a break from the communist past, as was noted earlier.211  So the new 
design would be one that would ideally represent Prague as they wanted to be 
represented.(Figure 13.  )   
With this in mind, the design team sought to bring the public in to the 
discussion of the design and to offer their opinions on the building as the design 
progressed. In fact, according to Milunic, the client insisted that the entire design 
process must be transparent.212  There was a significant response and there 
                                            
209 Maggie Toy, ed., Beyond the Revolution (London: Academy Group, 1996) 
210 Three prominent proposals included two post-communist towers, and one more fanciful 
design, resembling a Czechoslovak Joan of Arc.  Vlado Milunic, View into the Black Kitchen, 
1991. 
211 This is the thesis of Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe noted in Chapter II. 
212 Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic, Fialova, Irena, ed., Dancing Building, 58 
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were arguments both in favor and against the design as it progressed.213  Some 
thought the two towers of the modern design looked like a crushed can of Coke 
and represented the horrors of capitalism that some in the Czech Republic 
feared.214 
Others, though, joined the clients and the design team in the vision of a 
dancing couple.  This concept was adapted from some of the early designs of 
Milunic, who used the duality concept of yin and yang, static and dynamic, man 
and woman to portray post-communist Prague.215  They perceived the building 
as representative of a “society burst into motion.”216  From the beginning 
concept, this was the program that spurred on the design of the building.  Gehry 
envisioned this aesthetic metaphor, though he did not voice the idea in fear of the 
repercussions that may result if Czechs perceived him as importing Hollywood 
into the Prague architectural landscape. 
The resulting building is widely viewed as successful and has become 
somewhat of an icon for post-communist Prague.  Katerina Beckova, president of 
the Society for Old Prague is even fond of the building saying it is, “one of the 
few successful examples of a new building located in the city center.”217 
This brief history of the design of what became known as the “Dancing 
Building” shows how a new building, and a private construction at that, has 
become an architectural icon for the new Czech Republic.  It is an example of 
how stylistic metaphors to the past are not important to the national sentiment 
that is derived from a piece of architecture.  The sentiment is derived from the 
rhetoric surrounding the building and how it is received by the public.  Perhaps it 
was because the people wanted something new, or because the contrasting style 
                                            
213 Ibid., 25-26 
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aesthetically fit into the architectural landscape of Prague, but the “Dancing 
Building” has become a representation of the city that many take national pride 
in. 
4. Conclusion – Prague Architecture in the New Era 
This section has shown that citizens of Prague interact with their 
government through their attempts to preserve the architectural heritage of their 
city.  The political rhetoric mentioned in the earlier chapters was expressed by 
the people of Prague by their use of the democratic process.  They lobbied their 
government officials causing a change in the architecture of Prague through a 
change in legislation.  This example of democracy working for the people is 
another way that architecture is symbolizing the democratic process in Prague.  
In other words, this is a reflection of how the previous examples of national 
sentiment have played out in the post-communist era of architecture and politics. 
C. CONCLUSION – POST 1989 ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICAL 
POWER 
This democratic action has been seen in both Prague and Berlin through 
the course of this chapter.  Both post-communist capital cities have listened to 
the desires of the citizens and balanced the political desires of the elite to come 
up with a new architecture to represent them. 
In Prague, this representation is through the government agencies that 
control the planning and the aesthetics of the city while in Berlin the architecture 
is more directly affected.  The designs in Berlin are actually government projects 
that have been hotly debated by the population of eastern and western Germany 
alike.   Though there has been some difference between the two halves of 
Germany as well as between Germany and the Czech Republic, it is interesting 
here to note the similarities. 
As Åman predicted in his book, there has been a desire for a change of 
aesthetics that has gone along with the political change.218  The change has 
perhaps been more publicized in the German case, but has been no less evident 
                                            
218 Anders Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era, 
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to the citizens of Prague.  They have been as vehement about their architectural 
heritage as Berliners have been about their aesthetics for a new government.  
The resulting discussions in both cases have shown the desire for change as 
well as the democratic political process that has brought it to fruition.  The 
notable comparison, though, is that the style used in the two democracies is 
different.  In the case of Berlin, the democratic people have chosen a modern 
style to leave their wartime past behind them.  In Prague, on the other hand, they 
have chosen to maintain the aesthetic integrity of their city and have focused 
more on preservation.  Czechs have broken with their communist past by 
reflecting on the times before the Soviet Union. 
So the examples also demonstrate how political rhetoric in each case has 
been a developing factor in the role of architectural aesthetics in politics.  The 
rhetoric has been developed by the politicians as well as the populations 
involved, again reflecting how the interplay is carried out in a democratic polity.  
The desire to use architecture to create national sentiment and hence a tighter 
bond between the people has been the goal of the vehicle of architecture. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Architecture and politics have interacted throughout history.  The powerful 
have continually utilized architecture and other aesthetic instruments to further 
their programs.  This is demonstrated in Europe through the age of Religious 
power, the transitional period of the Enlightenment, and in the period of 
nationalism.  Finally, the interaction is noted in the latest period of political 
transition as we would expect in so tumultuous a time. 
Architecture and power is the interesting interaction, though.  The 
development of power through aesthetic means is not explainable in concrete 
terms, but the interaction can be noted through the past political periods.  The 
powerful have manipulated their aesthetic environments in a desire to express 
some form of ideology on the people.  This has been noted by constructive 
means of aesthetic creation, as well as the destruction of symbols that do not 
match the desires of the powerful. 
Nationalism was the final historical manifestation of political power noted 
in the study, and perhaps predictably they made extensive use of aesthetics in 
their rise.  The utilized the aesthetics of architecture as part of their national 
liturgy to call to the national sentiment of the people and join the nation together.  
The resulting nation-states have been some of the most powerful and cohesive 
throughout time, while they have also been some of the most barbarous.  
The barbarity is likely due to the use of Us and Them in the development 
of national sentiment.  The architectural and aesthetic tools were used among 
others to develop national sentiment and bring about national states.  The other 
primary tool of nationalization was the cult of the soldier, that used aesthetic 
instruments to glorify battle and the military and joined the definition of the Other 
in creating hatred in the nationalists. 
Prague and Berlin were finally explored as testaments to current political 
and architectural change in Europe.  They were seen to have noted the political 
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change through a change in architecture, though the style differed in the two 
cases.  Of course, there is also a difference in the two cases’ architectural 
development since 1989.  In Prague there has been a vast development of 
commercial architecture, but not as much debate on the government structures.  
In Berlin, on the other hand, the debate has been more on the government 
structures than on the private ventures and the character of the city.  The 
difference was one of forgetting the political past versus remembering the more 
distant past of democracy. 
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